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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can eliminate detector
side channels and prevent all attacks on detectors. The future of MDI-QKD is a quantum network
that provides service to many users over untrusted relay nodes. In a real quantum network, the
losses of various channels are different and users are added and deleted over time. To adapt to these
features, we propose a type of protocols that allow users to independently choose their optimal
intensity settings to compensate for different channel losses. Such protocol enables a scalable high-
rate MDI-QKD network that can easily be applied for channels of different losses and allows users
to be dynamically added/deleted at any time without affecting the performance of existing users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
to share a pair of random keys with unconditional secu-
rity. However, while theoretically secure, practical QKD
systems have detector side channels, which make them
susceptible to attacks from hackers, making detectors the
Achilles’ Heel of QKD systems [1, 2]. The measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD [3] protocol allows an
untrusted third-party to make measurements, thus avoid-
ing all security breaches from detector side channels.
MDI-QKD uses two channels between an untrusted
relay Charles and each of Alice and Bob. (Here in
this work, we will focus on only discrete-variable MDI-
QKD.) Since MDI-QKD depends on two-photon Hong-
Ou-Mandel interference, its secure key rate heavily de-
pends on the level of symmetry between the two chan-
nels, i.e., how close the two channel losses are [4, 5]. Pre-
vious experiments of MDI-QKD either were performed
in the laboratory over symmetric fibre spools [6–11], or
had to deliberately add a tailored length of fibre to the
shorter channel (to introduce additional loss) in exchange
for better symmetry [12].
The future of MDI-QKD is to implement a MDI-QKD
network - which, like a QKD network, allows many users
to securely communicate simultaneously, but does not
require trusted relays in the network, which is a huge ad-
vantage over traditional point-to-point QKD. Field im-
plementations of point-to-point QKD networks have been
reported in e.g., Refs.[13–15]. Importantly, all these
QKD networks require trusted relays between users that
exchange the keys acquired from point-to-point QKD ses-
sions with each user. Notably, Tang et al. [16] reported
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the first (and the only one to date) three-user star-shaped
MDI-QKD network experiment in a metropolitan setting.
However, the MDI-QKD network experiment also has the
limitation of being only feasible for near-symmetric chan-
nels. Using the parameter optimization algorithm in [17],
it chooses identical intensities and probabilities for all
three users. However, this is only possible because the
channels are nearly symmetric, and the key rate for such
a protocol will degrade very quickly with an increased
level of asymmetry between channels. (Note that, there
have also been proposals for continuous variable (CV)
MDI-QKD [18, 19], which provides high key rate for short
distances, but is typically limited to distances < 25km
even when assuming a high detector efficiency of 98%.)
In a realistic setup, a quantum network will very likely
have asymmetric channels due to different geographical
locations of sites. For instance, the channel losses in
Ref.[13, 14] are largely different. Here we select 5 nodes
from the Vienna QKD network [13] and show them in
Fig. 1(a), where the biggest difference between channels
is as large as 66km. If we’d like to perform MDI-QKD
over these locations, although one can add additional fi-
bres to each channel to compensate for channel differ-
ences, users will have to accommodate for the lowest-
transmittance channel – just like in “Liebig’s barrel” –
and have sub-optimal rate. Moreover, in a scalable net-
work with large numbers of dynamically added/deleted
users, it is not practical to add fibres and maintain sym-
metry between each pair of users all the time.
Additionally, if one is to implement a MDI-QKD net-
work over free-space between mobile platforms (e.g.,
satellite-based MDI-QKD [20] or maritime MDI-QKD
between ships), the losses in the channels are constantly
changing, and the channels will often be highly asymmet-
ric, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
The issue of MDI-QKD with asymmetric channel losses
was first considered in Ref. [4]. which provided a rule
of thumb on the ratio of intensities between Alice’s and
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2FIG. 1. (a) Part of the QKD network setup from Ref.[13].
Here as an example, we focus on the five nodes with high
asymmetry (Nodes A1, A3, A4, A5 connected with A2, corre-
sponding to nodes 1-5 in Ref.[13]), where A2 can be set up as
an untrusted relay. We keep the same topology and redraw
it as a star-shaped MDI-QKD network with four users con-
nected to a single untrusted relay. When performing MDI-
QKD, all users need to accommodate for the longest chan-
nel (i.e. A1) and add losses to their channels (e.g. ex-
tending to A′3, A
′
4, A
′
5), if previous protocols are used. (b)
Ship-to-ship communication and ground-satellite communi-
cation, where the participants’ distances to the detector are
constantly changing, and the channels will thus have quickly
varying asymmetry.
Bob’s signals. However, Ref. [4] was restricted to proto-
cols where the intensities of the optical signals are sym-
metric with respect to two bases, X and Z. In this paper,
we make no such assumption.
The key goal of the present paper is designing a soft-
ware solution that enables high key generation rate in a
general scalable MDI-QKD network with arbitrary losses
for various channels. More concretely, we propose a type
of asymmetric MDI-QKD protocols where intensities are
not only different for Alice and Bob, but also different
in X and Z bases. This type of protocols can provide as
much as 79 times higher key rate than previous protocols
[21] that were designed for symmetric channels. More-
over, it enables a much larger region of possible combi-
nations of channels. For instance, even at a small data
size of N = 1011 (N is defined as the total number of
pulses sent by Alice and Bob), one can generate a high
secret key rate of R = 10−7 per pulse even through an
extremely asymmetric channel pair of (0km, 90km) for
(Alice’s, Bob’s) channels, whereas with previous proto-
cols no key could be generated at all. This completely
removes the requirement of symmetric channels in MDI-
QKD.
So far, the optimal decoy state method for MDI-QKD
is the 4-intensity protocol proposed by Zhou et al. [21].
In this protocol, Alice and Bob each uses three intensities
{µ, ν, ω} in the X basis to perform decoy-state analysis
[22–24], and uses one signal intensity {s} in the Z basis
to generate the secret key. Including the probabilities P
for each intensity, the 4-intensity protocol uses the same
set of 6 parameters for Alice and Bob1:
[s, µ, ν, Ps, Pµ, Pν ].
The 4-intensity protocol can greatly improve MDI-QKD
performance under limited data size. However, it limits
its discussions to the symmetric case only (optimizing 6
parameters), which is suboptimal in an asymmetric set-
ting.
In Appendix A we provide an intuitive illustration of
why using prior protocols (with same parameters for Al-
ice and Bob) and adding additional fibres to channels are
suboptimal when channels are asymmetric, and how we
can get better performance by using different intensities
for Alice and Bob - which we will describe in detail in
the next section.
Moreover, we outline an important conceptual advance
here: a common folklore in the field is that MDI-QKD re-
lies on Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) dip and, therefore, it is
important to use matched intensities at the beam-splitter
of the receiver, Charles, in MDI-QKD. Here, we show
that such a folklore is, in fact, a misconception. We con-
sider the decoupling of the X-basis from the Z-basis. We
note clearly that for MDI-QKD, only the X-basis relies on
the indistinguishability of photons from the two beams,
while the Z basis does not require the indistinguishability
of the signals at all. Therefore, if we use the Z-basis to
send signals, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the
signal states are highly insensitive to intensity mismatch
at the beam-splitter of the receiver (Charles). This al-
lows us to independently vary the intensities of the users
(Alice and Bob) to optimize the key generation rate. The
detailed reasons will be described in Subsection II.A.
Overall, the type of protocols we propose have two
kinds of inherent asymmetries: the asymmetry between
Alice and Bob, and the asymmetry between X and Z
bases, which, together, enable the protocol to effectively
compensate for different pairs of channels and maintain
good key generation rate. We will describe how to opti-
mally choose these asymmetric parameters in Subsection
II.B, and present the simulation results to show the ef-
1 Although Ref. [21] mentioned on passing the possibility of using
different intensities of optical signals for Alice and Bob, little
analysis on this important case was performed there. So, up
till now, it has not been clear how exactly Alice and Bob could
compensate for asymmetric channel losses with different signal
intensities.
3fectiveness of our protocol compared with prior protocols
in Section III.
II. ASYMMETRIC PROTOCOLS
In this work, we show that it is possible to effectively
compensate for channel asymmetry by simultaneously
decoupling the X and Z bases and allowing asymmetric
intensities for Alice and Bob in decoy-state MDI-QKD.
In section II.A, we will provide a theoretical explana-
tion for the advantage of such a type of protocols, and
in section II.B we focus on one example implementation,
the case where three decoy intensities are used in the X
basis (which we denote as “7-intensity protocol”), and
discuss how to perform efficient parameter optimization.
Moreover, we also discuss other protocols such as using
two-decoys and four-decoys in the X basis to demonstrate
the generality of our concept.
Note that, our method proposed here is a general result
that can be applied to any decoy-state MDI-QKD proto-
col with WCP source, for both asymptotic and finite-size
cases. We show in Appendices B and C, that the scaling
of key rate versus distance is determined by the signal
states, so in principle any number of decoy states can be
used so long as they can effectively estimate the single-
photon contributions.
A. Concept
Here, let us first outline the key physical intuition be-
hind how to make a MDI-QKD protocol work effectively
when channels are asymmetric.
Consider the key rate formula of MDI-QKD [3, 21]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(1)
where QZss, E
Z
ss are the gain and QBER in the Z (signal)
basis, Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 are the lower (upper) bounds of single-
photon yield and QBER, estimated from the decoy state
statistics in the X basis (i.e. the observed gain and QBER
for decoy states QXij , E
X
ij , where i, j are decoy intensities,
such as in {µA, νA, ω} and {µB, νB, ω} if Alice and Bob
each chooses three decoy states), h2 is the binary entropy
function, and fe is the error-correction efficiency.
In the key rate formula, the first part corresponds to
key generation (where the privacy amplification depends
on the single-photon contributions estimated from decoy-
state analysis), and the second part corresponds to error-
correction for the signal states.
Here, we make two key observations:
(1) For MDI-QKD, only the diagonal (X) basis requires
the indistinguishability of the signals from Alice and Bob,
while the rectilinear (Z) basis does not.
FIG. 2. An example of the respective quantum bit error rate
(QBER) in X basis and Z basis (i.e. EZss and E
X
µµ) versus
ratio of intensities, for MDI-QKD using WCP sources. Pa-
rameters from Table I are used. Here we consider the case
where the respective distances from Alice and Bob to Charles
are LA = 60km, LB = 10km (i.e. the ratio of transmittances
in the two channels satisfies ηB/ηA = 10). We fix sB = 0.2
(or µB = 0.2) and scan over different sA (or µA). Specif-
ically, we also mark out the position where sAηA = sBηB
(µAηA = µBηB). Because QBER in the X basis heavily de-
pends on the visibility of two-photon interference, it is lowest
when intensities arriving at Charles’ beam-splitter are equal
(Similar observation has been made in Ref.[5].) However, im-
portantly, the Z basis does not require signal indistinguisha-
bility, and its QBER is determined mainly by misalignment.
The misalignment makes the Z basis QBER also slightly de-
pendent on the interference visibility, and lowest when arriv-
ing intensities are equal, but such QBER is much less sen-
sitive to unbalanced intensities and is relatively low even if
sAηA 6= sBηB. Therefore, by decoupling X and Z basis, we
can maintain highly balanced decoy state intensities arriving
at Charles in the X basis, while further optimizing signal in-
tensities to obtain higher key rate. As a quantitative example
of such difference in sensitivity, let us consider LA = 60km,
LB = 10km and N = 10
11 (Table IV line 1). An optimal
key rate of R = 3.1 × 10−5 can be achieved, where optimal
decoy state intensities satisfy µA/µB = νA/νB = 9 ≈ ηB/ηA,
and EXµµ, E
X
νν are both close to 25% (see Table IV for the full
list of intensities and probabilities). Even a relatively small
deviation, such as choosing µA/µB = νA/νB = 10
0.5 = 3.16
when fixing µB , νB (which results in E
X
µµ and E
X
νν close to
32%), results in zero rate. On the other hand, the optimal
signal states satisfy sA/sB = 3.5, which deviates from ηB/ηA,
but EZµµ is still a rather small 0.013. In fact, here even if we
choose sA = sB = 0.2, we can still get R = 1.0 × 10−5 while
EZµµ = 0.029.
(2) In our protocol, the intensities of the signal states
{sA, sB} used in the Z basis are independent from those
4of the decoy states used in the X basis, which means
that the privacy amplification process (to bound Eve’s
information on the final key, i.e. estimate the phase
error rate) in the X basis is completely decoupled from
error-correction in the Z basis for key generation.
Point (1) is because, in MDI-QKD, Charles performs a
Bell-state measurement with post-selection, making the
protocol different from a simple two-photon interference
in standard Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) dip. Here let us
follow the discussions in Ref. [3] (and consider the experi-
mental setup from Fig. 1 in Ref. [3]). Note that while Al-
ice and Bob randomly send signals in the X and Z bases,
Charles always measures in the Z basis (as defined by his
polarizing beam-splitter(PBS)) and post-selects detector
click events that correspond to the two Bell states |ψ+〉 =
1/
√
2(|HV 〉 + |V H〉) and |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉).
Such a post-selection results in an asymmetry between
the two bases. In the Z basis, only events where Alice
and Bob sent opposite states (e.g. |HV 〉 or |V H〉) are
accepted as bits. In these cases no photon interference
takes place and indistinguishability between the two in-
put photon beams is not required, because each of the
clicking detectors respectively only receives signal from
either Alice or Bob but never both. For WCP sources,
in the ideal case with no misalignment or dark counts,
the intensities of the pulses and even their spectrum and
timing need not be matching at all. In the X basis, how-
ever, the events may correspond to identical states sent
by Alice and Bob (e.g. |++〉 and |−−〉 corresponding to
|ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|++〉 − |−−〉)), which do interfere at the
beam splitter.2 To ensure that the correct events are trig-
gered, a good visibility of such a two-photon interference
is required. Note that for WCP sources, the interference
visibility is at most 50% (resulting in a 25% observed
QBER for EXµµ, E
X
νν even in the ideal case, but we can
perform decoy-state analysis to correctly estimate a low
eX,U11 for the single photon components) and the visibility
will quickly drop when intensities are mismatched, such
as observed in [5].
Therefore, a low QBER in the X basis heavily relies on
the indistinguishability of the signals and the balance of
incoming intensities at Charles, while such dependence is
not present in the Z basis.3 Such a conclusion is rather
2 Another case where Alice and Bob sent |+−〉 or |−+〉 corre-
sponds to the other Bell state, |ψ−〉. A two-photon interference
happens not at the beam splitter but at the polarizing beam split-
ter (PBS) instead. This setup is slightly different from HOM
interference but similar to that of Ref. [25], and also requires
indistinguishability of e.g. spectrum, timing, and matching in-
tensities. For simplicity, here we will use the term “two-photon
interference” for both cases.
3 In the non-ideal case with basis misalignment, there may be a
slight dependence in the Z basis too, as we see in Fig. 2, because
misalignment results in crosstalk between signals from the two
bases, but it will be a much smaller dependence than that in the
X basis.
general and also not dependent on the degree-of-freedom
used for qubit encoding - such as polarization encoding or
time-bin phase encoding (where |HV 〉 and |V H〉 in the Z
basis correspond to pairs of early and late pulses, which
will similarly not interfere at the beam splitter since they
have different timing).
Now, having explained the reason behind point (1), let
us discuss how the parameter choices in point (2) impact
the MDI-QKD protocol. For the decoy states, their role
is to estimate the single-photon contributions as accu-
rately as possible. As mentioned above, when channels
are asymmetric, using same intensities for Alice and Bob
(hence different intensities arriving at Charles after the
channels’ attenuation) will result in poor interference vis-
ibility and high QBER in the X basis, and consequently
poor estimation of eX,U11 . For a good interference visibil-
ity, Alice and Bob should try to maintain similar inten-
sities arriving at Charles, so the decoy intensities should
be chosen to roughly satisfy
µAηA = µBηB (2)
where ηA and ηB are the channel transmittances in Al-
ice’s and Bob’s channels. A similar equation holds true
for νA and νB.
For the signal states, they are not involved in privacy
amplification. On the other hand, they affect the sig-
nal state gain and QBER QZss, E
Z
ss (which determine the
amount of error-correction), and the probability of send-
ing single photons for key generation sAe
−sAsBe−sB . The
key point is, the QBER EZss does not require indistin-
guishability of the signals. If there is no misalignment or
noise, EZss would be zero regardless of incoming intensi-
ties. In practice, due to imperfections such as misalign-
ment, the QBER EZss (whose full expression can be found
in Appendix C Eq. C3) still slightly depends on channel
asymmetry and is also minimal if incoming intensities at
Charles are balanced - but this is for a much different
reason (due to misalignment) than that in the X basis
(mostly due to two-photon interference). Furthermore,
EZss is much less sensitive to channel asymmetry than
QBER in the X basis. We can observe this from Fig.2.
Note that, not only do signal intensities affect the sig-
nal state QBER, they also determine the probabilities
of sending single photons, hence affecting key generation
too. This means that, while having similar received sig-
nal intensities at Charles is surely one important criterion
in achieving good key rate, the optimal choice of signal
state intensities requires a trade-off between the single
photon probabilities and the error correction (and their
optimal values can be found by numerical optimization).
Generally speaking, the ratio of signal intensities sA/sB
does not satisfy a similar relation as Eq. (2), i.e. gener-
ally
sAηA 6= sBηB (3)
5Therefore, the protocols we propose have two inher-
ent asymmetries: an asymmetry between Alice and Bob
(so that they can have different intensities, and estab-
lish good two-photon interference in the X basis), and
an asymmetry between the X and Z bases (which allows
decoy and signal states to be independently optimized).
Such inherent asymmetries in the protocols allow us to
have novel choice of parameters and maintain good key
rate of MDI-QKD, even when Alice’s and Bob’s channels
have very different levels of loss. A more detailed discus-
sion on how such independent choices of decoy and signal
states affect the key rate can be found in Appendix D.
Note that, the security of such a protocol with decou-
pled bases and asymmetric intensities is also not com-
promised compared to prior art protocols. We make two
key assumptions: (1) Given the same photon number n
in a pulse, Eve has no way of differentiating the decoy
states from signal states in the same basis, and (2) the
single photons pairs in X and Z bases cannot be distin-
guished from each other. The first assumption ensures
the decoy-state analysis works even with asymmetric in-
tensities, and the second assumption ensures that decou-
pling of bases works. More details can also be found in
Appendix D.
In the next subsection we will discuss how to actually
choose the optimal decoy and signal intensities, and in-
troduce the main challenge in implementing such asym-
metric protocols - performing efficient parameter opti-
mization over a huge parameter space - and how we ad-
dress this problem by proposing two important theoreti-
cal results for the key rate function of asymmetric MDI-
QKD, and using them to design an efficient optimization
algorithm.
B. Parameter Optimization
The results in the previous subsection are general and
not limited to the number of decoys Alice and Bob use
in the X basis. For instance, while using signal states
{sA, sB} in the Z basis, in the X basis Alice and Bob
can each use a different set of two decoy states {µ, ν},
three decoy states {µ, ν, ω}, or even four decoy states
{µ, ν, ν2, ω}. The concept of asymmetric intensities be-
tween Alice and Bob can in principle also be applied to
prior art protocols with non-decoupled bases, such as in
Refs. [4, 26] (where Alice and Bob use the same three
decoy states {µ, ν, ω} for both bases, and the Z basis µ
is used as the signal state for key generation) - it is just
that such protocol will have lower key rate since µ cannot
simultaneously satisfy asymmetry compensation and key
rate optimization.
As an example, in Table II we list a comparison be-
tween the key rate of using different number of decoy
states (with and without asymmetric intensities between
Alice and Bob) in the presence of asymmetric channels.
We include the non-decoupled-bases case [4, 26] too. We
can see that, regardless of the protocol, using asymmet-
ric intensities between Alice and Bob always provides
higher key rate when channels are asymmetric. Also,
the three-decoy case provides significant performance im-
provement over either the two-decoy case or prior art pro-
tocol (which also has three decoy states, meaning that
decoupled bases is crucial in the compensation for chan-
nel asymmetry). While the asymmetric four-decoy case
can provide highest key rate, it provides a limited per-
formance increase (60%) over three-decoy, but comes at
a cost of more complex experimental implementation as
well as more difficult data collection and analysis. See
Appendix E for a more detailed comparison between the
protocols. Overall, we can see that the three-decoy case
provides a good balance between ease of implementation
and performance.
Therefore, for practicality here, in the following text we
will focus on the three-decoy case as a concrete example
(whose symmetric case is the 4-intensity protocol), and
generalize it to the asymmetric case by allowing Alice and
Bob to have independent intensities and probabilities.
This enables a “7-intensity protocol” (with 3 independent
{s, µ, ν} for each of Alice and Bob, and the vacuum state
ωA = ωB = ω = 0) in the asymmetric case.
For such a protocol, efficient and accurate parameter
optimization is crucial for obtaining good key rate (es-
pecially when considering the finite-size effects). For the
7-intensity protocol we need to use a total of 12 param-
eters for a full finite-size parameter optimization:
~v = [sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA , sB, µB, νB, PsB , PµB , PνB ].
here we denote the parameters as a vector ~v, and when
all devices and channel parameters (e.g. channel loss,
misalignment, dark count rate, detector efficiency, etc.)
are fixed, the key rate is a function of the intensities and
probabilities R(~v), and the question of intensity param-
eter optimization can be viewed as searching for:
~vopt = arg max~v∈V [R(~v)] (4)
where V is the search space for the parameters.
To provide a high key rate under finite-size effects, op-
timal choice of parameters is very important in imple-
menting the protocol. However, the 7-intensity proto-
col has an extremely large parameter space of 12 dimen-
sions, for which a brute-force search is next to impos-
sible. Therefore, to efficiently search over the parame-
ters in reasonable time, a local search algorithm must be
applied. But, as we will show here, an important char-
acteristic of asymmetric MDI-QKD is the discontinuity
of first-order derivatives for the function R(~v) with re-
spect to the intensity parameters in ~v. This means that
a straightforward local-search algorithm, such as previ-
ously proposed in [17], will inevitably fail to find the opti-
mal point, since it requires continuous first-order deriva-
tives of the searched function.
Here we will present two important theoretical results
6for the key rate versus parameter function, and propose
a method to circumvent the problem of discontinuous
derivatives and perform efficient and correct local search
in parameter space. This method helps us overcome
the biggest challenge in successfully implementing the 7-
intensity protocol.
FIG. 3. An example of the discontinuity of first-order deriva-
tives of Y L11 vs µA, µB function in decoy-state MDI-QKD, for
fixed values of νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1. Note the ridge on the line
µA
µB
= νA
νB
= 2.
Firstly, we propose that there is an inherent symmetry
constraint for the ratio of optimal decoy intensities, that
Theorem I. for any arbitrary choice of device
and channel parameters, the optimal decoy intensities
µoptA , ν
opt
A , µ
opt
B , ν
opt
B that maximize the key rate always
satisfy the constraint:
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
(5)
Secondly, we make an important observation that,
Theorem II. The key rate versus (µA, µB) function,
for any given νA, νB, does not have continuous first-order
derivatives.
Both of these theorems result from the fact that the
lower bound for single-photon yield, Y L11, in decoy-state
analysis (whose expression can be found in Ref. [4, 26]) is
a piecewise function that depends on whether µAµB ≤ νAνB ,
where a boundary line µAµB =
νA
νB
exists.
Theorem I states that, the optimal parameters that
maximize the key rate must lie exactly on this boundary
line, while Theorem II states that, the key rate does not
have a continuous partial derivative with respect to µA or
µB across this boundary line. This will cause the bound-
ary line to behave like a sharp “ridge”, on which the
gradient is not defined. An illustration for this “ridge”
can be seen in Fig. 3. A rigorous proof for Theorems I
and II in the asymptotic limit can be found in Appendix
F.
Using Theorems I and II it is possible to transform
the coordinates of the search variables, and eliminate
the undefined gradient problem of the key rate function.
More specifically, instead of expressing (µA, µB), (νA, νB)
in Cartesian coordinates, we can express them in po-
lar coordinates (rpolarµ , θ
polar
µ ), (r
polar
ν , θ
polar
ν ), where po-
lar angles satisfy θpolarµ = θ
polar
ν due to Theorem I. This
means we can jointly search for:
θpolarµν = θ
polar
µ = θ
polar
ν (6)
with respect to which the key rate is a smooth function
(graphically, this is because we are now always searching
along the ”ridge”). In Appendix G, we will describe in
more detail how to perform efficiently an optimization
of the parameters based on local-search to obtain a high
secure key rate for our 7-intensity protocol. Our method
allows extremely fast and highly accurate optimization
FIG. 4. Left: Comparison of rate vs (LA, LB). The rates are
plotted in contours in log-scale, from 10−2 to 10−10. We use
the parameters from Table I, and N = 1011. (a) using a pre-
vious 4-intensity protocol, (b) using our 7-intensity protocol.
As can be seen, while 4-intensity MDI-QKD is limited to only
high-symmetry regions, using 7-intensity can greatly increase
the applicable region of MDI-QKD, even in extremely asym-
metric regions such as (LA, 0) where one channel has zero
distance (point B). Moreover, we see that with 7-intensity
protocol both LA, LB components of the gradient for key rate
(red dotted arrow) are always negative, meaning that with
7-intensity protocol it is always optimal to only adjust the
intensities, and never necessary to add any fibre, while for 4-
intensity protocol, adding fibre (e.g. increasing LB at point C)
will sometimes increase the rate. Right: Comparison of rate
vs distance (Bob to Charles) for various fixed levels of mis-
match x = ηA
ηB
where ηA, ηB are the channel transmittances,
(c) using 4-intensity protocol (d) using 7-intensity protocol.
As can be observed, the higher the mismatch, the more advan-
tage 7-intensity protocol has (and only when the channels are
symmetric will the two protocols perform identically). Data
points from A1, A3, B1, B3 from Table III are also shown in
the plots.
7for asymmetric MDI-QKD, and takes below 0.1s for each
full local search (at any given distance) on a quad-core
i7-4790k@4.0GHz PC. Such computing efficiency makes
it possible for real-time optimization of intensities on-
the-field, and also makes possible a dynamic MDI-QKD
network that might add/delete new user nodes in real
time. In addition, in Appendix G we also discuss the ef-
fect of inaccuracies and fluctuations of the intensities and
probabilities on the key rate, and show that our method
is robust even in the presence of inaccuracies and fluctu-
ations of the parameters.
In summary, using our two Theorems and switching
to polar coordinates as in Eq. (6) allow us to greatly
simplify the optimization problem and allow standard
coordinate descent method to be applied here.
TABLE I. Parameters for numerical simulations, adopted
from [10], including detector dark count rate and efficiency
Y0, ηd, optical misalignment ed, error-correction efficiency f ,
and failure probability .
Y0 ηd ed f 
8× 10−7 65% 0.5% 1.16 10−7
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Now, we can proceed to study the performance of
asymmetric MDI-QKD protocols with full parameter op-
timization. Again, we use the 7-intensity protocol as a
concrete example as it provides a good trade-off between
performance and practicality. We also include simulation
results for protocols with alternative numbers of decoy
states in Appendix E.
In the main text we focus on the practical case of hav-
ing finite data size. The asymptotic case of infinitely
many data size (and an analytical understanding of the
ideal infinite-decoy case) is discussed in Appendices B
and C, and its simulation results can be found in Fig.8.
Our finite-key analysis is described in more detail in
Appendix H. For simplicity we consider a standard error
analysis in numerical simulations, but it is important to
note that our theory is fully compatible with composable
security. See Appendix H for discussions. In addition,
compared to the ”joint-bound” analysis as proposed in
Ref. [21] (which jointly considers the statistical fluctu-
ation of multiple observables. Such an analysis model
increases the key rate, but introduces multiple maxima
undesirable for local search), in the main text here we
have chosen to use an ”independent-bound” analysis for
our simulations, which considers each variables’ statis-
tical fluctuations independently, and is far more stable
and faster in simulations. However, we specifically note
here that all our methods are fully compatible with joint-
bound analysis. We list some representative results gen-
erated with joint-bound analysis in Table IV for com-
parison, and will discuss the different finite-size analysis
models in more detail in Appendix H.
Firstly, we consider the key rate for an arbitrary com-
bination of (LA, LB), and perform a simulation of key
rate over all possible range of Alice and Bob’s channels.
This provides a bird’s-eye view of how using 7-intensities
can affect the performance in asymmetric channels. We
show the results in Fig. 4 (a)(b). From the plot we can
make three important observations:
(1) Using 7-intensity protocol, we have a much wider
applicable region for asymmetric MDI-QKD, and accept-
able key rate can be acquired even for highly asymmetric
channels. In addition, 7-intensity protocol will always
provide higher key rate than 4-intensity protocol, except
when channels are already symmetric.
(2) No matter what position one is at, there is never
any necessity for adding loss when 7-intensity protocol is
used, and optimizing on-the-spot always provides highest
rate. Details can be seen in Fig. 4 caption.
(3) Using 7-intensity protocol, even extremely asym-
metric scenarios, such as (L, 0) where LB = 0, can be
used to generate a good key rate. In fact, this provides
an even higher rate than with symmetric channels such
as (L,L) (As the comparison between points A and B in
Fig. 4).
Point 3 has an important practical implication: it can
lead to a new type of “single-arm” MDI-QKD setup.
More details can be found in Appendix I and Fig. 13.
Here for Points 1-3, we have a good physical under-
standing of why allowing different intensities for Alice
and Bob can provide a larger region where key rate is
positive. As discussed in Section II.A, MDI-QKD re-
quires highly balanced intensities arriving at Charles on
the two arms in the X basis for good HOM interference,
as well as roughly similar (but not necessarily balanced)
levels of arriving intensities in the Z basis, which opti-
mize a trade-off between error-correction and probability
of sending single-photons. (The optimal choice of inten-
sities is subject to numerical optimization as described in
Subsection II.B). Prior methods with same intensities for
Alice and Bob will suffer from high QBER both in X and
Z basis, while our method decouples X and Z basis, and
optimally chooses Alice and Bob’s signal and decoy inten-
sities respectively to compensate for channel asymmetry
in both bases, ensuing low QBER and allowing for much
higher key rate under channel asymmetry. Such effect
is present in both asymptotic and finite-key scenarios,
and is the underlying reason that the 7-intensity proto-
col can allow high-rate MDI-QKD regardless of channel
asymmetry.
Additionally, we show that, when channels are highly
asymmetric, the asymptotic key rate of the 7-intensity
protocol scales quadratically with the lower transmit-
tance among the two channels - which means that, al-
beit always being able to provide higher key rate and be-
ing much more convenient than e.g. adding fibres when
channels are asymmetric (which is a relation we rigor-
8TABLE II. Example key rate comparison among MDI-QKD protocols where Alice and Bob use different numbers of decoy
states in X basis (and each keeps one signal state in the Z basis). The protocol in Ref. [4, 26] where bases are not decoupled
is also included for comparison. We use parameters from Table I, LA = 60km, LB = 10km, and N = 10
11. We can see that,
regardless of the protocol, using asymmetric intensities between Alice and Bob always provides higher key rate when channels
are asymmetric. The three-decoy protocol has significantly higher key rate than either the prior art protocol (which also
uses three decoy states but uses non-decoupled bases) or two-decoy case. While the asymmetric four-decoy case can provide
highest key rate, it provides a limited performance increase of 60%, but comes at a cost of a more complex experimental
implementation and more difficult data collection and analysis. Therefore, in the presence of channel asymmetry, the three-
decoy case, whose asymmetric case corresponds to the “7-intensity protocol” (marked in bold), provides a good trade-off
between ease of implementation and performance.
Parameters prior art protocol in [4, 26] two-decoy three-decoy four-decoy
Symmetric 6.834× 10−10 0 3.890× 10−7 1.057× 10−5
Asymmetric 5.378× 10−7 7.715× 10−6 3.106× 10−5 4.932× 10−5
TABLE III. Simulation results for asymmetric MDI-QKD in two scenarios: case A (10km, 60km) and case B (30km, 60km), using
parameters from Table I and N = 1011. We define channel mismatch as x = ηA
ηB
where ηA, ηB are the channel transmittances.
Note that in reality, Alice and Bob cannot modify the physical channels, and they can either add loss to the channels or keep
them as-is, but cannot decrease channel loss. Three strategies are compared here: A1 and B1 represent using the old 4-intensity
protocol directly. A2 and B2 (not in Fig. 4) represent adding fibre to the shorter channel to match the longer channel, i.e.
making the channels (60km, 60km). And A3, B3 represent using our new 7-intensity protocol without modifying the channels.
As shown here, 7-intensity protocol always returns higher rate than both strategies using 4-intensity protocol.
Protocol Point x LB LA Rate Comparison with 4-intensity protocol
4-intensity protocol A1 0.1 10km 60km 3.891× 10−7 -
4-intensity protocol + fibre A2 1 60km 60km 1.862× 10−6 +379%
Our protocol A3 0.1 10km 60km 3.106× 10−5 +7883%
4-intensity protocol B1 0.25 30km 60km 4.746× 10−6 -
4-intensity protocol + fibre B2 1 60km 60km 1.862× 10−6 -61%
Our protocol B3 0.25 30km 60km 1.445× 10−5 +204%
ously prove in Appendix C.2 for the asymptotic case),
the 7-intensity protocol will not change the asymptotic
scaling properties of MDI-QKD key rate, which is still
quadratically related to transmittance - physically, this
is understandable, since although we effectively compen-
sate for channel asymmetry with optimized intensities
and allow good Hong-Ou-Mandel interference at Charles
for decoy states, MDI-QKD still fundamentally depends
on two single signal photons both passing through the
channels, hence its key rate is quadratically related to
transmittance, even in the asymmetric case with com-
pensated intensities. More detailed discussions and ana-
lytical proofs of the above observations can be found in
Appendices B and C.
Now, as a concrete example, let us consider two sets
of channels at (LB = 10km,LA = 60km) and (LB =
30km,LA = 60km), through which Alice and Bob would
like to perform MDI-QKD. We compare strategies of us-
ing the 4-intensity protocol, directly or with fibres added
until channels are symmetric, with directly using our 7-
intensity protocol. As can be seen in Table III, using 7-
intensity protocol can sometimes provide as much as 79
times higher key rate, and its rate is also always higher
than either strategies with 4-intensity protocol.
In fact, we can also show this by plotting key rate vs
LB under a fixed mismatch x =
ηA
ηB
where ηA, ηB are the
channel transmittances (i.e. fixed difference between LA
and LB). This is also the scenario studied by Ref. [4].
Results are shown in Fig. 4 (c) and (d). The data points
A1/A3 and B1/B3 in Table III are also plotted. As can
be seen, the higher the asymmetry between channels, the
more improvement we can gain from using 7-intensity
protocol.
Here, we also list some examples of optimal parame-
ters found by the optimization algorithm, which are listed
in Table IV. As we can observe from the table, Alice
and Bob adjust their intensities to compensate for chan-
nel asymmetry. Physically, since MDI-QKD depends on
Hong-Ou-Mandel interference of two WCP sources in the
X basis, we expect the received intensity for decoy state
at Charles to be similar on the two arms to ensure good
visibility (and consequently lower QBER) in the X ba-
sis, i.e. the ratio of decoy intensities µAµB and
νA
νB
would
roughly follow the rule-of-thumb of µAηA = µBηB, which
is indeed what we can observe from Table IV and Fig.5.
On the other hand, the ratio of signal intensities
sA
sB
deviates more from ηBηA . This is because, as men-
9TABLE IV. Examples of optimal parameters for the 7-intensity protocol, using simulation parameters from Table I. The
numerical values are rounded to the accuracy of 0.001 in the table here. As can be observed, Alice and Bob’s intensities
compensate for channel asymmetry, while their intensity probabilities are mostly identical - since the intensities have already
compensated for the asymmetry - despite having have some numerical noises (as the key rate is not sensitive to the probabilities
near the maximum, the algorithm satisfies with them having close enough, rather than perfectly identical, values, so the optimal
values found are still slightly different even when x = 1). As shown in Section II, the optimal decoy state ratios are the same,
i.e. µA
µB
= νA
νB
. Moreover, we can observe that the ratio of decoy states more closely follows 1
x
than the ratio of signal intensities.
LA LB x sA µA νA PsA PµA PνA sB µB νB PsB PµB PνB R
60km 10km 0.1 0.662 0.522 0.100 0.600 0.033 0.255 0.202 0.058 0.011 0.600 0.031 0.256 3.106× 10−5
60km 30km 0.25 0.593 0.457 0.089 0.581 0.036 0.266 0.294 0.125 0.024 0.580 0.034 0.269 1.445× 10−5
60km 60km 1 0.402 0.305 0.063 0.478 0.047 0.330 0.402 0.305 0.063 0.480 0.047 0.329 1.862× 10−6
FIG. 5. Here we plot the ratios of signal intensities and decoy
intensities versus distance, when channel mismatch is fixed at
x = 0.1 (i.e. LA = LB + 50km). The simulation parame-
ters are from Table I (and this plot of intensities corresponds
to the solid red key rate line in Fig. 4 (d)) We also include
the line ηB
ηA
= 10 for comparison. We can observe that, the
ratio of decoy states roughly follows ηB
ηA
(to maintain good
HOM interference visibility in X basis), while the optimal
ratio of signal intensities varies greatly between 1 (optimal
for probability of sending single photon) and ηB
ηA
(optimal for
EZss). This is because signal states affect both key generation
and error-correction, so having similar intensities arriving at
Charles after channel attenuation is not the only criteria for
good key rate, and optimal parameters do not necessarily sat-
isfy sAηA = sBηB. In fact, since signal states in Z basis are
decoupled from X basis, and EZss is less sensitive to unbalanced
arriving intensities, sA
sB
can be much more freely optimized be-
tween 1 and ηB
ηA
, allowing 7-intensity protocol to have higher
key rate.
tioned in Subsection II.A, signal intensities not only af-
fect the Z basis QBER, but also need to optimize a trade-
off between the single photon probabilities and error-
correction. This makes it usually not follow sAηA =
sBηB. An illustration of the ratios of decoy intensities
and signal intensities can be seen in Fig. 5.
Now, having demonstrated the new 7-intensity pro-
tocol, we proceed to introduce a powerful reality ap-
plication for it: a scalable high-performance MDI-QKD
network where any node can be dynamically added or
deleted. We consider the channels from a real quantum
network setup in Vienna, reported in Ref.[13]. We focus
here on the high-asymmetry nodes, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, as
shown in Fig. 1(a). We found that our method leads to
much higher key rates, and allows easy dynamic addition
or deletion of nodes. Since intensities can be indepen-
dently optimized for each pair of channels, the estab-
lishment of new connections does not affect any exist-
ing connections, hence providing good scalability for the
network (compared to e.g. the case of using 4-intensity
protocol with the strategy of adding fibres, where each
channel needs to accommodate for the longest link among
all channels). See Appendix J for numerical results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed a method of effectively
compensating for channel asymmetry in MDI-QKD by
adjusting the two users’ intensities and decoupling the
two bases (with the 7-intensity protocol being a highly
practical example that works well under finite-size ef-
fects). Such a method can drastically increase the sce-
narios MDI-QKD can be applied to while maintaining
good key rate. This study provides a powerful and ro-
bust software solution for a scalable and reconfigurable
MDI-QKD network.
Our method is also a general result that is not limited
to the 7-intensity form, but can in principle be used
for e.g. alternative number of decoys, or alternative
finite-size analysis models (e.g. joint-bounds analysis,
or composable security with Chernoff’s bound). It is
also potentially applicable to other types of quantum
communication protocols, such as Twin-Field QKD [27],
or MDI quantum digital signature [28, 29], which both
use WCP sources and decoy-state analysis. We hope
that our proposal can inspire more future work on the
study of asymmetric protocols.
Notes Added: After the completion of an earlier ver-
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sion of our manuscript, we have now experimentally im-
plemented our protocol in [30, 31], thus demonstrating
clearly the practicality of our work.
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Appendix A: Note about Adding Fibre
FIG. 6. Setup for asymmetric MDI-QKD. When channels
are highly asymmetric (e.g. Alice and Bob1), to increase the
symmetry in the channel, sometimes one adds additional loss
to the system in Bob’s lab[12], in exchange for better symme-
try. When estimating the key rate, Bob assumes that both
Charles-Bob1 and Bob1-Bob2 channels are controlled by Eve.
This is therefore a pessimistic estimation of key rate, and is
not necessarily the optimal strategy.
In this section we provide an intuitive description of
why adding additional loss is suboptimal, and how our
method works better with asymmetric channels.
Previously, when Alice and Bob have asymmetric chan-
nels, a common solution is to add fibre (thus adding loss)
to the shorter channel in exchange for better symme-
try, such as in Ref. [12]. Afterwards one selects sym-
metric intensities for Alice and Bob and acquires higher
rate. However, the added fibre lies in Bob’s lab, and is
in fact securely under control of Bob. But by assum-
ing a symmetric setup, we are effectively relinquishing
its control to Eve, and pessimistically estimating the key
rate. Therefore, intuitively, this is not necessarily the op-
timal strategy. We will show with our new protocol that,
when the channels are asymmetric, Alice and Bob can
independently choose their optimal intensities, and that
optimizing intensities and probabilities alone is sufficient
to compensate for the different channel losses.
Appendix B: Scaling of Key Rate with
Transmittance
In this section we discuss the scaling properties of key
rate versus transmittance, for prior protocols with same
parameters for Alice and Bob, and our new protocol that
uses different intensities for Alice and Bob. We will show
in Appendices B and C that the scaling of the key rate
versus distance is mainly determined by the signal states
(so long as we have good single photon estimation from
decoy states). This also means that, the advantage of our
method is really not dependent on the number of decoy
states used or the finite-size analysis model used (or lack
thereof, in the asymptotic case), and our results are in
principle applicable to any protocol that decouples the
signal and decoy states in the Z and X bases and allows
different intensities for Alice and Bob.
The transmittance of the two channels are (ηA, ηB),
and the asymmetry (mismatch) x is defined as
x =
ηA
ηB
(B1)
1. Single-Photon Source
Now, let us consider a single-photon case first. That is,
suppose Alice and Bob both send perfect single photons
only, and the key is generated from two-photon interfer-
ence. If we ignore the dark counts, the asymptotic key
rate can be written as [32]:
RSP = ηA × ηB × [1− 2h2(e11)] (B2)
where h2 is the binary entropy function and e11 is the
QBER (which is a quantity that, when dark count rate
is ignored, is independent of the transmittance). This
means that in the perfect single-photon case, the key rate
is proportional to ηAηB, and the mismatch x does not
explicitly appear in its expression:
RSP ∝ ηAηB (B3)
In fact, for a given total distance LA + LB = L, any
positioning of the untrusted relay Charles (e.g. at the
midpoint, in Alice’s lab, or in Bob’s lab) would not affect
the key rate, since ηAηB only depends on L.
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2. Weak Coherent Pulse Source
The previous discussion for single-photon MDI-QKD
suggests that, by nature, there is not really any limita-
tion on symmetry for MDI-QKD, at least for the ideal
single photon case. Then, where does this dependence of
key rate on channel symmetry which we observed come
from? In this section, we will show that the scaling of key
rate depends on the signal states’ trade-off between error-
correction and probabilities of sending single-photons,
when using WCP sources, rather than privacy ampli-
fication (which depends on estimation of single-photon
contributions).
More concretely, (as we will prove in the next section)
for protocols with symmetric intensities, there are two
sharp cut-off values for the mismatch, xmax and xmin,
that prevent the protocol from acquiring any key rate
when x > xmax or x < xmin (and optimizing identical in-
tensities sA = sB cannot circumvent this problem). This
is why protocols such as 4-intensity protocol are limited
to near-symmetric positions.
On the other hand, when a protocol allows indepen-
dent intensities for Alice and Bob (such as our new 7-
intensity protocol described in the main text), we show
that the mismatch can always be compensated by opti-
mizing intensities sA and sB (hence lifting the limitations
xmax and xmin). In fact, we show that for positions with
high asymmetry, key rate no longer depends on mismatch
x = ηAηB at all, and the optimal key rate only scales with
the smaller of the two channel transmittances. That is,
Roptimal ∝ min(η2A, η2B) (B4)
which means that, the biggest advantage of protocols
with independent intensities for Alice and Bob (e.g. 7-
intensity protocol) is to completely lift the limitation on
channel asymmetry. When compared with adding fibre
to maintain asymmetry, we see that its scaling property
is still the same, i.e. quadratically related to the (smaller
of) channel transmittances, although our method will
always perform better (by a constant coefficient) than
adding fibre. Moreover, it provides the convenience of
not needing additional fibre, which may not be feasible in
free-space channels, or when channel mismatch is chang-
ing.
Proofs for the above scaling properties can be found in
the next section.
Appendix C: Proof of Scaling Properties of Key
Rate with Transmittance
In this section we outline the analytical proofs for
the observations on the scaling properties of asymptotic
MDI-QKD key rate versus transmittance in the presence
of asymmetry, described in Appendix B. We also discuss
how the finite-decoy and finite-size effects can be consid-
ered as imperfections in the infinite-decoy, infinite-data
case, and that the scaling properties are still approxi-
mately the same - which are only determined by the sig-
nal states’ trade-off between error correction and prob-
abilities of sending single photons, and not affected by
decoy states.
To simplify the discussion, it is convenient to first use
a few crucial approximations as described in Ref.[4]:
1. We consider the asymptotic case with infinite data
size.
2. We assume an infinite number of decoy states, i.e.
Alice and Bob can perfectly estimate the single photon
gain Y11 and QBER e11. In this case, Alice and Bob only
need to choose appropriate signal intensities sA, sB.
3. We ignore the dark count rate Y0, when studying
the scaling properties with distance (as background noise
only affects the maximum transmission distance where
transmittance is at the same order as the dark count
rate, but does not affect the overall scaling properties of
key rate versus distance).
4. When describing the channel model to estimate the
observable gain and QBER QZss and E
Z
ss (which affect the
error-correction), we make second-order approximations
to two functions:
I0(x) ≈ 1 + x
2
4
+O(x4)
ex ≈ 1 + x+ x
2
2
+O(x3)
(C1)
where I0 is the modified bessel function of the first kind.
This approximation is relatively accurate when sAηAηd
and sBηBηd are both small, where ηd is the detector
efficiency.
With the above approximations, one can write the key
rate conveniently as (excerpting Eq. C.1 and C.2 from
Ref.[4]):
R =
η2Bη
2
d
2
G(x, sA, sB) (C2)
where G(x, sA, sB) is a function determined by (sA, sB)
and the asymmetry x only:
G(x, sA, sB) = xsAsBe
−(sA+sB)[1− h2(ed − e
2
d
2
)]
− 2xsAsB + (s
2
B + x
2s2A)(2ed − e2d)
2
× feh2(EZss(x, sA, sB))
EZss(x, sA, sB) =
(sB + xsA)
2(2ed − e2d)
2[2xsAsB + (s2B + x
2s2A)(2ed − e2d)]
(C3)
where h2 is the binary entropy function.
Now, having described the key rate function, we
are interested in how it scales with the transmittances
12
ηA, ηB, using different optimization strategies for the
intensities. We will discuss two cases:
1. Rsymmetric, where Alice and Bob use the same in-
tensity s = sA = sB, and optimize s.
2. Roptimal, where Alice and Bob fully optimize a pair
of intensities sA, sB, which can take different values.
1. Symmetrically Optimized Intensities
Let us consider the case where Alice and Bob use the
same intensity s = sA = sB, and optimize s. This is
the case discussed by previous protocols (such as the 4-
intensity protocol, although here to simplify the proof
we focus on infinite-decoy case and only consider signal
intensities).
In this case, the function G is optimized over s (and is
a function of x only). The rate satisfies
Rsymmetric = max
s
R ∝ η2B max
s
G(x, s, s) (C4)
therefore, Rsymmetric is proportional to η
2
B when channel
mismatch ηAηB is fixed.
Moreover, since Rsymmetric is also proportional to
G(x), we will have Rsymmetric = 0 if G(x) = 0. Note
that, we can rewrite the signal state QBER EZss as:
EZss(x) =
(1 + x)2(2ed − e2d)
2[2x+ (1 + x2)(2ed − e2d)]
(C5)
since the equal intensities are canceled out, i.e. EZss is
only a function of x. In fact, EZss is a function that min-
imizes at x = 1 and reaches 50% (where Rsymmetric is
naturally zero) when x → 0 or x → ∞. Therefore, if
G(x) 6= 0 at x = 1, there must exist some critical val-
ues of xmax and xmin which result in a sufficiently large
QBER such that G(x) = 0 (and Rsymmetric = 0).
This means that, Rsymmetric is quadratically related
to ηB (or ηA) when mismatch
ηA
ηB
is fixed, but also has
two cut-off positions for critical levels of mismatch, be-
yond which no key can be generated. These two crit-
ical mismatch positions are what limit previous MDI-
QKD protocols to near-symmetric positions. Also, as
we have previously mentioned, we see that this critical
dependence on mismatch actually comes from the error-
correction part (which involves EZss).
2. Fully Optimized Intensities
Now, let us consider the case where Alice and Bob are
allowed to fully optimize their intensities sA, sB (such as
in the 7-intensity protocol, although again, here we only
focus on the signal states in the infinite-decoy case).
FIG. 7. Rate vs distance contours for single photon MDI-
QKD RSP , decoy-state MDI-QKD with symmetric intensities
Rsymmetric, and with fully optimized intensities Roptimal. We
plot the contour line of R = 10−9.5. Here for a better com-
parison with WCP sources, we arbitrarily set a probability
P11 = sAsB × e−(sA+sB) (where sA = sB = 0.6533) of sin-
gle photon pairs being sent when calculating RSP . For the
decoy-state case, as described in Appendix C, we assume in-
finite decoys, infinite data size, ignore dark count rate, and
take second-order approximation when calculating gain and
QBER (so that we only focus on the ideal scaling properties
of key rate with distance). As can be seen, RSP is not lim-
ited by asymmetry, and takes constant value for any fixed
LA +LB (meaning that the dependence of key rate on asym-
metry does not come from single photon contributions in the
privacy amplification part when using WCP sources). For
decoy-state MDI-QKD, we can clearly see Rsymmetric being
limited by the two cut-off lines where |LA − LB| takes max-
imum value (which corresponds to critical values of channel
mismatch xmax and xmin). On the other hand, Roptimal is not
limited by asymmetry, and has contours nearly perpendicular
to the axes when asymmetry is high (meaning that, when one
channel is significantly longer than the other, Roptimal is only
dependent on the longer channel).
In this case, the function G is optimized over sA, sB.
The rate satisfies
Roptimal = max
sA,sB
R ∝ η2B max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) (C6)
Now, let us focus on the properties of G(x, sA, sB).
Looking at its expression Eq. (C3) in the previous sec-
tion, we make the important observation that, except for
the term e−(sA+sB) in the single photon probabilities, ev-
ery other term is only a function of sB and xsA (rather
than x and sA separately). We can re-write G(x, sA, sB)
as
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G′(x, s′A, sB) = s
′
AsBe
−s′A
x e−sB [1− h2(ed − e
2
d
2
)]
− 2s
′
AsB + (s
2
B + s
′2
A)(2ed − e2d)
2
× feh2(EZss(s′A, sB))
EZss(s
′
A, sB) =
(sB + s
′
A)
2(2ed − e2d)
2[2s′AsB + (s
2
B + s
′2
A)(2ed − e2d)]
(C7)
where we define equivalent intensity s′A as
s′A = sA × x (C8)
Moreover, if ηA  ηB (i.e. mismatch x  1), we can
approximately assume that
e
−s′A
x ≈ 1 (C9)
which means that we can rewrite max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) as
Gmax = max
s′A,sB
G′(s′A, sB) (C10)
which, importantly, is a constant value not dependent
on the value of x, when x  1. The actual value of sA
equals
sA =
s′A
x
(C11)
Physically, this means that, when there is asymmetry
between Alice and Bob’s channels, we can compensate
for this asymmetry by adjusting the intensities, to keep
the same ”equivalent intensity” received by Charles and
keep EZss at a low value. In this case, E
Z
ss is no longer
limited by the mismatch x, and we can perform MDI-
QKD at arbitrary values of asymmetry.
Also, the key rate is now given by:
Roptimal ∝ η2BGmax (C12)
This means that, when ηA  ηB (e.g. the ”single-arm”
case previously mentioned where LA is much shorter than
LB), the key rate of asymmetric MDI-QKD is only re-
lated to ηB and still quadratically scales with ηB. When
ηB  ηA, though, we can rewrite x′ = ηBηA , and rewrite
Roptimal ∝ η2A max
s′B,sA
G′(s′B, sA) (C13)
Therefore, overall,
Roptimal ∝ min(η2A, η2B) (C14)
Now, we plot the two cases (symmetric intensities
and fully optimized intensities) in a contour plot. As
we can observe in Fig.7, the key rate Rsymmetric has
two cut-off mismatch positions beyond which key rate is
zero. This limitation is removed when full optimization
of intensities is implemented. Moreover, for Roptimal, we
see that the contours are perpendicular to the axes in
high asymmetry regions, which means that the key rate
only scales with the longer of the two channels.
Also, note that, from Eqs. (C4), (C6), we can also
make the observation that there is never any need to add
fibre to the shorter channel when fully optimizing the in-
tensities, and our new method always provides higher key
rate than prior art technique of adding fibre till channels
are symmetric, while using same intensities for Alice and
Bob.
To show this, consider the system having a fixed longer
channel LB (i.e. suppose ηB is fixed and ηA > ηB, x =
ηA
ηB
> 1). Adding loss to ηA is equivalent to decreasing x.
With symmetric intensities (and adding loss till ηA =
ηB), the key rate can be written as:
Rsymmetric =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
s
G(1, s, s) (C15)
Suppose we fully optimize the intensities for this case
with added fibre, we will obtain the same key rate (since
for x = 1, i.e. symmetric setup, the optimal choice of
intensities satisfies sA = sB):
max
s
G(1, s, s) = max
sA,sB
G(1, sA, sB) (C16)
However, let us compare it with the case of using fully
optimized intensities and no additional loss:
Roptimal =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB) (C17)
As described in Eq. (C7), we can re-write G(x, sA, sB)
as G′(x, s′A, sB) (recall that the equivalent intensity s
′
A
is defined as xsA). We make the observation that
G′(x, s′A, sB) strictly increases with x. That is, for any
two given values of s′A, sB and x > 1,
G′(x, s′A, sB) > G
′(1, s′A, sB) (C18)
hence after optimization we also have
max
s′A,sB
G′(x, s′A, sB) > max
s′A,sB
G′(1, s′A, sB) (C19)
which means that, when fully optimizing Alice and Bob’s
intensities (which already compensate for the mismatch
between channels), it is always optimal not to add any ad-
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ditional loss to the channels. Moreover, combining Eqs.
(C15), (C16), (C17), (C19), we can see that
Roptimal =
η2dη
2
B
2
max
sA,sB
G(x, sA, sB)
>
η2dη
2
B
2
max
s
G(1, s, s) = Rsymmetric
(C20)
That is, compared to the case where one adds loss to ηA
until ηA = ηB, our new protocol always provides higher
key rate as long as the channels are asymmetric. In-
tuitively, this is because adding fibre while using same
intensities for Alice and Bob is in fact an suboptimal
subset of the overall set of strategies Alice and Bob can
take (which includes adjusting Alice and Bobs intensities
independently, as well as adding any length of fibres to
change x). Even when considering adding fibre as one
of the valid variables, we have shown that optimal point
always happens when no fibre is added. Therefore, our
method is a better optimized strategy than adding fibre
because it considers a larger parameter space.
Note that, fully optimizing Alice and Bob’s intensities
does not change the fundamental scaling property - the
key rate is still quadratically related to transmittance in
the longer arm - However, it always provides better key
rate than prior art techniques, and also offers the great
convenience of not having to physically add loss to the
channels and being able to implement everything in soft-
ware.
3. Practical Imperfections
Up to here we have analytically shown how choosing
to fully optimize the intensities can affect the key rate,
for the asymptotic, infinite-decoy case. The behavior of
contours as shown in Fig.7 is a result of sA, sB compen-
sating for the difference in channel loss. However, we
have so far assumed perfect knowledge of single-photon
contributions, and have not yet discussed the decoy-state
intensities. Moreover, non-ideal experimental parameters
(including dark count rate and detector efficiency), and
finite-size effects will both affect the key rate. Here in this
subsection, we compare the key rate under more practi-
cal assumptions, and show that the above factors can
be considered as imperfections that reduce the key rate,
but maintain similar contour shapes and scaling prop-
erties for the key rate - that is, we will still observe a
high dependence on asymmetry for protocols with iden-
tical intensities for Alice and Bob, and fully optimizing
intensities can completely lift this limitation.
In practice, with a finite number of decoys (for in-
stance, for 4-intensity and 7-intensity protocols, where
Alice and Bob choose respectively three decoy intensi-
ties, µ, ν, ω), the estimation of Y11 and e11 is not per-
fect, therefore the key rate will be slightly lower than the
aforementioned infinite-decoy case. Moreover, to accu-
FIG. 8. Contours of rate vs distance for decoy-state MDI-
QKD, under different assumptions for practical imperfections,
for the key rates for asymptotic case with infinite decoys (and
ideal assumption of zero dark count rate and 100% detector
efficiency), asymptotic case with 4-intensity/7-intensity pro-
tocol (with practical device parameters), and finite-size case
with 4-intensity/7-intensity protocol. Top: protocols with
identical intensities for Alice and Bob, Bottom: protocols
with fully optimized intensities. (Note that in the bottom plot
there are some noises in the asymptotic 7-intensity protocol
key rate. This is because the optimal ν can take a very small
value in the ideal case where data size is infinitely large. This
results in some numerical noises in computer simulations).
We plot the contour lines of R = 10−7. As can be observed
here, the finite number of decoys, the non-ideal experimen-
tal parameters, and the finite-size effects are all imperfections
that reduce the key rate. However, the overall shapes of the
contours still remain largely the same, which follow the up-
per bounds given by the ideal infinite-decoy case. (Except for
4-intensity protocol under finite-size effect, which no longer
has two clear cut-off mismatch positions, but is still severely
limited by channel asymmetry, while 7-intensity protocol lifts
this constraint completely).
rately estimate Y11 and e11, the decoy intensities need
to be optimized to compensate for channel loss, too. As
described in Subsection II.A in the main text, the de-
coy states should maintain balanced arriving intensities
at Charles (e.g. µAηA = µBηB), to ensure good HOM
visibility and low QBER in the X basis. Note that, the
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optimization of decoy intensities has a very different pur-
pose from that of the signal intensities sA, sB - the signal
intensities are optimized so as to reduce EZss (while keep-
ing single photon probability sAsBe
−(sA+sB) high) and
maximize the key rate, while the decoy intensities are op-
timized to estimate Y L11 and e
U
11 as accurately as possible,
whose ideal values Y11 and e11 (used in the infinite-decoy
case above) provide an upper bound for the practical key
rate with finite number of decoys. As we see in Fig.8,
the asymptotic key rate with a finite number of decoys
follows a similar shape as its upper bound, the infinite-
decoy case.
Additionally, the detector efficiency (which is equiv-
alent to channel loss) contributes to a uniformly shifted
key rate in both LA and LB directions, while dark counts
reduce the key rate more significantly in the higher loss
region (both of which we have ignored in the ideal case
as described at the beginning of this section). However,
as observed in Fig.8 (the solid lines consider both finite-
decoys and practical parameters), these factors do not
change the overall shape of the contours either.
Lastly, finite-size effect will reduce the key rate sig-
nificantly. As observed in Fig.8 bottom plot, while the
key rate is reduced, the contour shapes remain largely
unchanged (meaning that even under finite-size effect,
the 7-intensity protocol can still effectively compensate
for channel asymmetry effectively). In Fig.8 top plot,
we can find similar observations, that finite-size effect
reduces the overall key rate. However, note that, under
finite-size effect, the shapes of key rate contours for the 4-
intensity protocol are somewhat different, and no longer
follow the two cut-off positions xupper, xlower for channel
mismatch (which appear as straight lines in e.g. Fig.7).
This is because, though the key rate is still limited by
EZss (which causes the cut-off mismatch positions), it is
also limited by the estimation of Y L11 and e
U
11 using the de-
coy states. Compared to the asymptotic case, here under
finite-size effect, the increased eU11 is likely a more severe
limiting factor than EZss, and not being able to choose
independent intensities for Alice and Bob prevents an
accurate estimation of Y L11 and e
U
11 (due to poor HOM
visibility in X basis caused by unbalanced intensities).
Therefore, here the dependence of key rate on channel
asymmetry is present in both privacy amplification and
error-correction terms, and the shapes of contours are a
result of both effects. (The difference in contour shape
from the infinite-decoy case is more prominent for finite-
size case, likely because the key rate is more sensitive to
eU11 here). Importantly, under finite-size effects, the key
rate for 4-intensity protocol is still highly limited by chan-
nel asymmetry, while 7-intensity protocol completely re-
moves such a constraint and allows two channels with
arbitrary asymmetry between them.
Appendix D: Note about Decoupling Signal and
Decoy Intensities
In this section we provide a simple intuitive explana-
tion for why our protocol provides a better choice of de-
coy and signal intensities.
1. Performance
Let us recall again the key rate formula of MDI-QKD
[3, 21]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(D1)
Here there are three criteria that determine whether
a MDI-QKD protocol generates good key rate in the
presence of channel asymmetry:
(a) Similar arriving intensities at Charles in the X ba-
sis, in order to have good HOM interference and keep
QBER low in the X basis (which is important for a good
estimation of eX,U11 ).
(b) Similar arriving intensities at Charles in the Z ba-
sis, in order to keep QBER EZss low in the Z basis (which
is due to misalignment), although this term is much less
sensitive to difference in intensities than (a).
(c) A high enough probability of sending single-
photons, sAe
−sAsBe−sB . Note that both criteria (b) and
(c) involve the signal states sA, sB, so there is a trade-off
between (b) and (c).
Prior protocols require Alice and Bob to use the same
set of intensities. This overly constrains the solution
space (because Alice and Bob try to use the same set
of intensities to satisfy (a), (b) and (c) simultaneously),
and leaves high QBER in both the X and Z bases, and
thus resulting in low key rate when channels are asym-
metric.
By relaxing this constraint (allowing Alice and Bob
to have different intensities), and decoupling criteria (a)
from criteria (b) and (c) by allowing independent decoy
and signal intensities, we can satisfy (a) nicely, while si-
multaneously achieving a good trade-off between (b) and
(c), hence ensuring a high key rate.
Remark : for more detail on the trade-off between (b)
and (c), here (b) is optimal when arriving intensities are
matched, i.e. sA/sB = ηB/ηA, and (c) is independent
of asymmetry and is optimal when signal intensities
are both 1. In fact, since EZss is much less sensitive to
sA/sB, such a trade-off between two terms favors (c)
more than (b), thus the optimal sA/sB is often closer
to 1 than ηB/ηA. The actual optimal signal intensities
can be found by numerical optimization, as described in
Section II.B. An example of µA/µB and sA/sB can also
be seen in Fig.5, where we observe that µA/µB follows
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ηB/ηA rather closely, while sA/sB has relatively much
more freedom in its optimization (between 1 and ηB/ηA).
2. Security
Another point is, our parameter choice not only pro-
vides better performance, but also ensures no less se-
curity than in prior art protocols. The security of our
protocol relies on two key assumptions: (1) Given the
same photon number n in a pulse, Eve has no way of
differentiating the decoy states from signal states in the
same basis, and (2) the single photons pairs in X and Z
bases cannot be distinguished from each other.
Under the first assumption, the yields of photon num-
bers m,n in Alices and Bobs channel in the X basis sat-
isfy Y Xm,n(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
X
m,n(µ
2
A, µ
2
B), when Alice and Bob
use two different intensity pairs {µ1A, µ1B} and {µ2A, µ2B}
(µ1A, µ
2
A can be any state among Alice’s decoy inten-
sities, and similarly µ1B , µ
2
B can be any state among
Bob’s decoy intensities). Similarly, the QBERs satisfy
eXm,n(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = e
X
m,n(µ
2
A, µ
2
B). This is a reasonable as-
sumption because, by only observing the photon num-
bers in a pulse, Eve has no way of telling which in-
tensity setting it comes from. Therefore, the observ-
ables from different intensity combinations can be used
as linear constraints for decoy-state analysis in the X
basis. This idea is in essence the same as the founda-
tions for decoy-state BB84 in Refs. [22–24] and decoy-
state MDI-QKD in Ref. [3]. Note that, for successful
decoy-state analysis we do not require the symmetry be-
tween the two bases, i.e. Y Xm,n(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = Y
Z
m,n(µ
2
A, µ
2
B)
or eXm,n(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) = e
Z
m,n(µ
2
A, µ
2
B) for multi-photon pulses
are not required.
The second assumption is that single photon pairs sent
in X or Z bases cannot be distinguished from each other.
That is because, regardless of the basis used for encoding,
the single photon pairs that can trigger Charles detection
events are always in Bell states |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉. That is,
the states sent by Alice and Bob satisfy ρX1,1 = ρ
Z
1,1, and
Eve has no way of telling apart which basis a pair of single
photons come from. Therefore, we can safely assume that
Y X11 = Y
Z
11, which is the reason we can perform decoy-
state in the X basis only to estimate Y X11 , and assume
that Y Z11 = Y
X
11 .
The security of a scheme of decoupling the bases in
MDI-QKD and using the assumption of Y Z11 = Y
X
11 has
been theoretically studied in Ref. [21] and (in the Ap-
pendix of) Ref. [33] 4, and the scheme has also been
experimentally demonstrated in Ref. [10] and Ref. [33]
- although all these works were focused on the scenario
4 The idea of decoupling the bases was first studied for BB84 in
Ref. [34]. There the assumption was Y Z1 = Y
X
1 for single pho-
tons instead of single photon pairs.
of symmetric channels only, and did not discuss the role
of decoupled bases in compensating channel asymmetry,
which is one of the main novelties of our work. However,
physically, the only difference between the signals sent
from Alice and Bob in our protocol and those in prior
protocols will be the different intensities on the two arms
(which we know, from assumption one Y Xm,n(µ
1
A, µ
1
B) =
Y Xm,n(µ
2
A, µ
2
B), will not affect the security of decoy-state
analysis), and for decoupled bases we make the same as-
sumption Y Z11 = Y
X
11 about single photons, which is no
less secure than prior works either.
Appendix E: Generality of Our Method: MDI-QKD
Protocols other than Three Decoy States
In the main text we have focused on the 7-intensity pro-
tocol, where Alice and Bob each uses one signal intensity
sA (sB), and three decoy intensities µA, νA, ω (µB , νB , ω).
However, the core idea of our protocol lies in two key
points: (1) X and Z bases are decoupled, where decoy-
states in the X basis bound Eve’s information and signal
state in the Z basis encodes the key, and (2) Alice and
Bob use different intensities to compensate for channel
asymmetry. This means that our protocol is not limited
to the 7-intensity protocol, but can easily be applied to
other protocols too, as long as points (1) and (2) are
satisfied.
In this section, we demonstrate the generality of
our method by actually applying it to other kinds of
MDI-QKD protocols where Alice and Bob use a different
number of decoy intensities in the X basis, and show that
similar advantages as with the 7-intensity protocol can
be observed when using asymmetric intensities. We will
also show with numerical results that, although these
alternative protocols will certainly work, the 7-intensity
protocol provides a good balance between performance
and ease of experimental implementation.
Here we compare three cases:
1. Alice and Bob each uses two decoy intensities µA, νA
(µB , νB) in the X basis. We denote this case as a 6-
intensity protocol (including the two signal intensi-
ties), where the parameter choices are:
[sA, µA, νA, PsA , PµA , PνA ,
sB , µB , νB , PsB , PµB , PνB ]
(E1)
Here PνA = 1−PsA−PµA and PνB = 1−PsB−PµB . This
is similar to the ”one-decoy” setup that was discussed
in Ref. [17]. Note that here it’s not a “5-intensity”
protocol, because using µA, µB , ω alone is not sufficient
to satisfactorily bound the single-photon contributions
and will result in low or zero key rate. Therefore, in this
setup, the vacuum state is not used, and Alice and Bob
each uses two non-zero decoy states.
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2. Alice and Bob each uses three decoy intensities
µA, νA, ω (µB , νB , ω) in the X basis. This case is the 7-
intensity protocol we discussed in the main text, where
the parameter choices are
[sA, µA, νA, ω, PsA , PµA , PνA , PωA ,
sB , µB , νB , ω, PsB , PµB , PνB , PωB ]
(E2)
Here PωA = 1 − PsA − PµA − PνA , PωB =
1 − PsB − PµB − PνB , and ω is the vacuum state
(for simplicity we can assume ω = 0).
3. Alice and Bob each uses four decoy intensities
µA, νA, ν2A, ω (µB , νB , ν2B , ω) in the X basis. We denote
this case as a 9-intensity protocol, where the parame-
ter choices are
[sA, µA, νA, ν2A, ω, PsA , PµA , PνA , Pν2A , PωA ,
sB , µB , νB , ν2B , ω, PsB , PµB , PνB , Pν2B , PωB ]
(E3)
Here PωA = 1−PsA−PµA−PνA−Pν2A , PωB = 1−PsB −
PµB − PνB − Pν2B , and ω is the vacuum state.
Note that in all of these three protocols, the key rate
formula stays the same as Eq. (1):
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(E4)
What is changing here is only the estimation of the single-
photon contributions, namely the yield Y X,L11 and QBER
eX,U11 . While we have analytical bounds for decoy-state
analysis [4] for the 7-intensity protocol, we use a lin-
ear programming approach to numerically estimate Y X,L11
and QBER eX,U11 in the 6-intensity and 9-intensity cases.
Such an approach has been widely discussed in literature
as in Refs.[17, 35, 36].
Now, we perform numerical simulations with the 6-
intensity, 7-intensity and 9-intensity protocols, and show
that they all have much higher performance than their
symmetric-intensity counterparts when channel asymme-
try is present. This demonstrates the generality of our
method as using asymmetric intensities can always im-
prove the performance of MDI-QKD with asymmetric
channels.
We also compare the performances of the three pro-
tocols with each other, and show that using more decoy
intensities can always guarantee higher or equal perfor-
mance than using fewer decoy intensities, regardless of
data size and asymmetry. The 7-intensity always pro-
vides no smaller key rate than the 6-intensity protocol,
and although 9-intensity protocol can potentially provide
even higher key rate, the advantage is small, and the 7-
intensity protocol we used in the main text is a good
balance between key rate performance and ease of exper-
imental implementation.
Interestingly, as observed in Fig. 9 (a)(b), for the 6-
intensity and 9-intensity protocols, although the yield
Y X,L11 and QBER e
X,U
11 are estimated numerically using
linear programming, there is still a ”ridge” (discontinuity
in first-order derivatives) along µAµB =
νA
νB
, and νAνB =
ν2A
ν2B
as we saw for 7-intensity protocol in the main text. For
6-intensity protocol, the ridge is very clearly shown. For
9-intensity protocol, the ridge exists but is less promi-
nent, and sometimes not visible (likely because, e.g. if
two pairs of proportional decoy states νAνB =
ν2A
ν2B
already
provide good estimation of Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 , the third pair
µA, µB has more freedom, and wouldn’t affect the decoy-
state analysis or the key rate too much even if it doesn’t
provide good HOM visibility and results in high EXµµ).
FIG. 9. Left: Examples of Y X,L11 versus µA and µB where
other parameters are all fixed for (a) 6-intensity protocol and
(b) 9-intensity protocol. Just like for 7-intensity protocol, we
can see a ridge along µA
µB
= νA
νB
, or µA
µB
= νA
νB
=
ν2A
ν2B
. Note
that the ridge is a lot less obvious for 9-intensity protocol (and
sometimes is not visible) likely because two proportional pairs
of decoy-states can estimate single-photon contribution rea-
sonably well, so the third pair (µA, µB) here has more freedom
in choice of intensities. Right: Comparison of rate vs LB for
6-intensity, 7-intensity and 9-intensity protocols, where mis-
match x = 0.1, i.e. LA = LB + 50km (assuming fibre loss
0.2dB/km). The rates are plotted in log-scale. We use the
parameters from Table I, and N = 1012. (c) using symmet-
ric intensities for Alice and Bob, (d) using fully optimized
asymmetric parameters for Alice and Bob. As can be seen,
using asymmetric intensities can greatly improve key rate
for all three protocols, when channel asymmetry is present.
Note that there is a higher amount of noise present for the
9-intensity case due to the numerical instability brought by
linear program solvers (similar to that of joint-bound finite-
size analysis, which will be discussed in Appendix H), but the
key points here are that the 9-intensity protocol also bene-
fits considerably from using asymmetric intensities, and that
the 9-intensity protocol does not have a significant advantage
over the 7-intensity protocol despite being more complex to
implement.
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We plot the simulated key rate for the protocols in
Fig. 9 (c)(d). We first consider a similar scenario as
Fig. 4 (c)(d), using parameters from Table I, a channel
mismatch of ηAηB = x = 0.1, and data size of N = 10
12
(here we use a larger data size than in the main text,
since for N = 1011, 6-intensity protocol with symmetric
intensities cannot generate key rate even at LB = 0km
so a comparison is not immediately clear in the plot). As
shown in Fig. 9, for each protocol, allowing asymmetric
intensities provides a much higher key rate than using
symmetric intensities only, demonstrating the general ef-
fectiveness of our method for different protocols under
channel asymmetry.
We also make an important observation here: The
more decoy intensities one uses, the higher key rate one
can obtain after parameter optimization, even with finite-
size effects considered (e.g. the 9-intensity protocol al-
ways has higher key rate than 7-intensity, and 7-intensity
also always has higher rate than 6-intensity). This is be-
cause, for instance, the 6-intensity protocol can in fact
be considered as a special case of the 7-intensity proto-
col, just with PωA and PωB infinitely close to zero, and
with 9 instead of 4 constraints for e.g. the gains QXij
when estimating Y X,L11 . With close to zero data, the 5
new constraints are obviously very loose (with very large
finite size fluctuation) and will not provide any useful in-
formation, but the key point is, in a linear program these
loose constraints will not decrease the key rate. There-
fore, any optimal set of parameters for the 6-intensity
protocol can also be considered as a valid set of parame-
ters for the 7-intensity protocol, i.e. the parameter space
of 6-intensity protocol is a subset of that of the 7-intensity
protocol, and the latter always provides no smaller key
rate than the former (and often the 7-intensity protocol
can find a better parameter set in the larger parameter
space, resulting in higher key rate).
The same goes for the 9-intensity protocol, but as we
have seen in Fig. 9, the advantage it provides over the
7-intensity protocol is rather small (compared to e.g. 6-
intensity versus 7-intensity), while requiring more com-
plex control of the intensity modulators in the experi-
mental setup, and more complicated data collection and
analysis: the users need to collect 16 sets of gains and
error-gains, and the parameter optimization is also a lot
slower and more unstable (evaluating the linear program
is on average slower than analytical expression by about
50 times, and linear programs also introduce numerical
instabilities). Similar observations have been made for
the symmetric case in Ref. [17] (although in this pa-
per the signal states are not decoupled from decoy states
so the protocols are slightly different) that using decoy
states {µ, ν, ω} provides higher key rate than {µ, ν}, but
adding one more decoy-state ν2 provides little further
advantage.
Therefore, our conclusion is that, while our method
of asymmetric intensities and decoupled bases surely
works well with other protocols such as 6-intensity and
9-intensity protocols, the 7-intensity protocol we intro-
duced in the main text strikes a good balance between
key rate performance and the ease of both experimental
implementation and data analysis.
Appendix F: Decoy State Intensities
In this section we will described Theorems I and II
in more detail, and show their theoretical proofs in the
asymptotic limit of infinite data size (Moreover, numeri-
cally, we found that Theorems I and II in fact hold true
even under finite-size effects).
1. Symmetry of Optimal Decoy Intensities
To prove Theorem I, here we will actually propose an
even stronger assumption for µA, µB:
Theorem III. for any arbitrary choice of device and
channel parameters, and any two given values of νA, νB,
the optimal decoy intensities µoptA , µ
opt
B that maximize R
always satisfy the constraint:
µoptA
µoptB
=
νA
νB
(F1)
Remark: as will be shown below, Theorem I is
simply a corollary from Theorem III.
Proof for Theorem III: Here for convenience, we
first limit the discussion to asymptotic case (i.e. infinite
data size), and we assume that the vacuum intensity is
indeed ω = 0. Throughout the rest of the text, we will
use Qkij and E
k
ij to denote the observed gain and QBER,
where, if not specified, the first subscript is Alice’s in-
tensity, and the second is Bob’s intensity, which can be
chosen from {sA, µA, νA, ω} and {sB, µB, νB, ω} for Al-
ice and Bob, respectively. The superscript k signifies the
basis X or Z (although, here we only explicitly write the
basis for illustration purposes, since the basis is already
implied by the choice of intensities).
First, looking at the key rate expression [3, 21]:
R = PsAPsB{(sAe−sA)(sBe−sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(F2)
we can see that only the term Y X,L11 [1−h2(eX,U11 )], i.e. the
decoy-state analysis and privacy amplification, is deter-
mined by the decoy intensities (and probabilities, if finite-
size effect is considered) only, and not affected by the sig-
nal intensities sA, sB. This is an important and very con-
venient characteristic of the 4-intensity/7-intensity pro-
tocol, that the signal state is only concerned with key
generation, while the decoy states are only responsible
for privacy amplification. That is, the optimization of
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FIG. 10. An example of the two difference cases of Y X,L11 vs µA, µB function, for fixed values of νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1. Left: Y
a
11,
where µA
µB
≤ νA
νB
(”case 1”); Right: Y b11, where
µA
µB
> νA
νB
(”case 2”). Allowed regions are marked in color for either cases. In case
1, we show that
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0, so any given point A can descend along µB axis (the solid black arrow) to get higher rate, until it
reaches boundary line µA
µB
= νA
νB
where µB is highest. Similarly, in case 2,
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0, so any given point B can descend along µA
axis until µA
µB
= νA
νB
to get highest rate. Therefore, the optimal (µoptA , µ
opt
B ) that maximize the piecewise function Y
X,L
11 always
occur on the boundary line. Moreover, for any given point C(µA, µB) on the boundary line, the function values of Y
a
11, Y
b
11 are
the same. However, we show that
∂Y a11
∂µA
at C1 is not equal to
∂Y b11
∂µA
at C2 (along the dot-dash red lines). Therefore, the piecewise
function Y X,L11 is not smooth.
decoy-state intensities is decoupled from the key genera-
tion. Now, we can make an observation that, under given
device parameters and channel loss, the optimization of
the decoy intensities is independent of sA, sB, and its only
goal is to maximize Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )].
Furthermore, to perform the decoy state analysis, we
note that the upper bound for single-photon QBER sat-
isfies the form of:
eX,U11 = f(Y
X,L
11 , νA, νB) (F3)
where eX,U11 is only determined by Y
X,L
11 , νA and νB. The
full expression, as in [4], is listed below:
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBQXννE
X
νν − eνAQXνωEXνω
−eνBQXωνEXων +QXωωEXωω)
(F4)
.
Now, suppose we first fix two arbitrary values of νA, νB,
and try to maximize Y X11 [1 − h2(eX11)] by optimizing
µA, µB, we can see that maximizing Y
X,L
11 will suffice,
since it will simultaneously minimize eX,U11 , whose only
component dependent on µA, µB is Y
X,L
11 . The question
now becomes simply finding:
(µoptA , µ
opt
B ) = argmax(Y
X,L
11 (µA, µB)) (F5)
A very important characteristic of Y X,L11 is that, its
expression is dependent upon whether µAµB ≤ νAνB , i.e. it
is a piecewise function, as described in Ref.[4]:
Case 1: If µAµB ≤ νAνB :
Y X,L11 = Y
a
11 =
1
(µA − νA) [
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ ]
(F6)
Case 2: otherwise, if µAµB >
νA
νB
:
Y X,L11 = Y
b
11 =
1
(µB − νB) [
µB
νAνB
QM1νν −
νB
µAµB
QM2µµ ] (F7)
where we denote the two expressions of Y X,L11 in the
two cases as Y a11 and Y
b
11, and the two terms Q
M1
νν and
QM2µµ are linear combinations of the observable Gain, and
are functions of (νA, νB) and (µA, µB) only, respectively.
Their full expressions can be found in Appendix F.3.
Also, note that if µAµB =
νA
νB
, the two cases Y a11 = Y
b
11.
Now, we can make a key observation, that in case 1, for
any given µA, the partial derivative
∂Y a11
∂µB
always satisfies
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0 (F8)
(The actual expression of the partial derivative and proof
of its positivity are shown in Appendix F.3). However, in
case 1, µB is bounded by µB ≥ µAνBνA , so the only optimal
case is to take the boundary condition
20
µoptB =
µAνB
νA
(F9)
This means that, in the region of µAµB ≤ νAνB , any two
optimal value pair (µoptA , µ
opt
B ) must satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
= νAνB ,
or else we can always decrease µB to get a higher rate,
meaning that the previous point is not the actual maxi-
mum. We illustrate this behavior in Fig.10.
Similarly, for case 2, the partial derivative with respect
to µA satisfies
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0 (F10)
and µA is bounded by µA >
µBνA
νB
. In the same way, in
case 2 for any given µB, we can acquire:
µoptA =
µBνA
νB
(F11)
Up to here, we have proven that Theorem III is indeed
correct.
Proof for Theorem I: Now, following the same idea,
any four optimal value pair (µoptA , µ
opt
B , ν
opt
A , ν
opt
B ) must
satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
, or else we can always vary (µA, µB)
while keeping (νA, νB) fixed, and let
µA
µB
= νAνB to get a
higher rate, meaning that the previous point is not the
actual maximum. Therefore, we have shown that Theo-
rem I is indeed correct, that the optimal decoy intensities
always satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
(F12)
Note that the same conclusion doesn’t hold true for
traditional 3-intensity MDI-QKD (i.e. using {µ, ν, ω} for
both X and Z basis and using µ in Z basis to generate the
key), that is because the key rate for 3-intensity depends
on µ for both key generation and error-correction, such
that QZµµ, E
Z
µµ terms and the single-photon probability
µe−µ both depend on µ, hence optimizing only Y L11 is no
longer sufficient. Therefore, this independence of s from
µ, ν is an additional advantage that the 4-intensity/7-
intensity protocol can provide, under asymmetric condi-
tions.
Also, one thing to note is that, although the above
theorem provides us with a way to constrain µAµB ,
νA
νB
, the
actual values of these ratios still need to be found by
optimization. In Ref. [4], the authors have proposed a
rule-of-thumb formula for finding optimal intensities:
µAηA = µBηB (F13)
for which we now have a good understanding of the rea-
son - such a relation keeps the arriving intensities bal-
anced at Charles, in order to maintain good HOM visi-
bility in the X basis and low QBER.
However, this is still only a rough approximation, and
is an exact relation only when the dark count rate Y0
is ignored, data size is infinite, and infinite number of
decoys are used (Ref. [4] considered the case where µ
is both the signal and decoy intensity, and only proved
Eq. (E13) to be exact in the ideal infinite-decoy case
with no noise). For a general case, µA/µB is not always
exactly equal to ηB/ηA (and does not only depend on the
mismatch x = ηA/ηB) but rather deviates slightly from
it when (ηA, ηB) changes. But at least, one general rule is
that µA/µB decreases with x = ηA/ηB, or, to put in more
simple words, the larger the channel loss, the higher the
intensities we should choose to compensate for the loss.
2. Non-smoothness of Key Rate vs Intensities
Function
In the previous section we have shown that the piece-
wise expression for Y X,L11 causes the optimal value to
occur on the boundary line µAµB =
νA
νB
. Here we continue
to show that Theorem II is a result of this piecewise
function, too.
Proof of Theorem II: The theorem means that, the
key rate does not have a continuous partial derivative
with respect to µA or µB at the boundary line. This will
cause the boundary line to behave like a sharp ”ridge”.
To prove this, instead of differentiating Y a11 vs µB and Y
b
11
vs µA, here we perform partial differentiation of both Y
a
11,
Y b11 vs µA, and observe this discontinuity of derivative.
First, we rewrite Y11 into:
Y a11 =
νA
(µA − νA) [
1
νAνB
QM1νν −
1
µAµB
QM2µµ ] +
1
νAνB
QM1νν
Y b11 =
νB
(µB − νB) [
1
νAνB
QM1νν −
1
µAµB
QM2µµ ] +
1
νAνB
QM1νν
(F14)
The last term is not dependent on either µA or µB.
Note that, here on the boundary of µAµB =
νA
νB
, the values
of Y a11 and Y
b
11 are equal:
Y a11 = Y
b
11 (F15)
Performing the partial differentiation against µA, we
can get:
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∂Y a11
∂µA
=− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
+
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
)
∂Y b11
∂µA
=− νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
(F16)
We can see that, on the boundary of µAµB =
νA
νB
, the
first terms are again equal, however, the second term in
∂Y a11
∂µA
is strictly larger than 0 (detailed proof by expanding
QM2µµ , Q
M1
νν are shown in Appendix F.3). Therefore,
∂Y a11
∂µA
6= ∂Y
b
11
∂µA
(F17)
The derivatives of Y X,L11 vs µA on the two sides of the
”ridge” are not equal, causing the rate function R to
be have a non-defined gradient. A similar proof can be
applied to µB and it leads to the same result.
An illustration can be seen in main text Fig. 2, which
chooses a given set of values (νA = 0.2, νB = 0.1) and
plots the key rate over (µA, µB). As can be clearly ob-
served, there is a sharp ridge on the line µAµB =
νA
νB
= 2,
meaning the key rate function versus intensities is not
smooth.
3. Proof of Negativity of Partial Derivatives for
Decoy Intensities
As described above, the expression for the single-
photon yield, Y X,L11 depends on whether
µA
µB
≤ νAνB . For
case 1, if µAµB ≤ νAνB , we would like to prove that
Lemma I:
∂Y a11
∂µB
and
∂Y b11
∂µA
are both always negative.
Proof of Lemma I: Here, we use a simplified model
of the GainQXij as in Ref.[4], which ignores the dark count
rate Y0, and takes a second-order approximation for the
modified Bessel function:
QXµµ =
η2Bη
2
d
4
[2xµAµB + (µ
2
B + x
2µ2A)(2ed − e2d)] (F18)
where ηB is the transmittance in Bob-Charles channel,
x = ηAηB is the channel mismatch, ηd is the detector effi-
ciency, and ed is the misalignment. Here for convenience
we can further define
 = 2ed − e2d, T =
η2Bη
2
d
4
(F19)
such that
QXµµ = T (2xµAµB + µ
2
B + x
2µ2A) (F20)
Now, let us consider
∂Y a11
∂µB
where
Y X,L11 = Y
a
11 =
1
(µA − νA) [
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ ]
(F21)
To calculate the single-photon gain, the two terms:
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
(F22)
are linear combinations of the observable Gains QZij .
We can make the observation that, only the term
− νA
(µA − νA)µA
(
QM2µµ
µB
)
(F23)
contains µB, so, we only need to prove the positivity of
∂
∂µB
(
QM2µµ
µB
), where
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
= eµA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ
(F24)
substituting with Eq. (E20),
1
T
QM2µµ = (2xµAµB + x
2µ2A + µ
2
B)e
µA+µB
− x2µ2AeµA − µ2BeµB
= 2xµAµBe
µA+µB
+ x2µ2Ae
µA(eµB − 1) + µ2BeµB(eµA − 1)
(F25)
Therefore,
QM2µµ
µB
= T × [2xµAeµA+µB + x2µ2AeµA
eµB − 1
µB
+ (eµA − 1)µBeµB ]
(F26)
note that here, as µA, µB > 0, we have e
µA , eµB > 1, and
each of the three functions satisfy
∂
∂µB
(eµA+µB) > 0
∂
∂µB
(
eµB − 1
µB
) > 0
∂
∂µB
(µBe
µB) > 0
(F27)
Therefore, we have proven that ∂∂µB (
QM2µµ
µB
) > 0 and
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that
∂Y a11
∂µB
< 0. Similarly, we can also prove that
∂Y b11
∂µA
< 0.
Thus, the optimal point (µoptA , µ
opt
B ) must happen on the
boundary, i.e.
µoptA
µoptB
=
νA
νB
(F28)
4. Proof of Discontinuity of Partial Derivatives for
Decoy Intensities
Now, to prove the discontinuity of the first-order
derivatives of the key rate function, we need to show
that
Lemma II: Partial derivative of Y a11 and Y
b
11 with re-
spect to µA, i.e.
∂Y a11
∂µA
and
∂Y b11
∂µA
are not equal.
Proof of Lemma II:
∂Y a11
∂µA
=− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
+
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
)
∂Y b11
∂µA
=− νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
(F29)
On the boundary of µAµB =
νA
νB
, the first terms are equal,
i.e.
− νA
µA − νA
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
) = − νB
µB − νB
∂
∂µA
(
QM2µµ
µAµB
)
(F30)
However, here we have to show that the second term in
∂Y a11
∂µA
is strictly larger than zero:
νA
(µA − νA)2 (
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
) > 0 (F31)
or, since µA > νA and µA, νA > 0, simply
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
> 0 (F32)
Just like in Appendix F.3, we can expand the gain QXij
using Eq. (E20):
QM1νν
νAνB
= 2xeνA+νB + x2
νA
νB
eνA(eνB − 1)
+ 
νB
νA
eνB(eνA − 1)
QM2µµ
µAµB
= 2xeµA+µB + x2
µA
µB
eµA(eµB − 1)
+ 
µB
µA
eµB(eµA − 1)
(F33)
Subtracting them, we can acquire:
QM2µµ
µAµB
− Q
M1
νν
νAνB
= 2x(eµA+µB − eνA+νB)
+ x2(µAe
µA
eµB − 1
µB
− νAeνA e
νB − 1
νB
)
+ (µBe
µB
eµA − 1
µA
− νBeνB e
νA − 1
νA
)
(F34)
Note that, when a given variable x > 0, the functions
d
dx
(ex) > 0
d
dx
(
ex − 1
x
) > 0
d
dx
(xex) > 0
(F35)
Therefore, these three functions strictly increase with
their variable x, i.e. for any x1 > x2, f(x1) > f(x2).
Now, we can use the conditions µA > νA, µB > νB, and
acquire:
eµA+µB > eνA+νB
µAe
µA > νAe
νA
µBe
µB > νBe
νB
eµA − 1
µA
>
eνA − 1
νA
eµB − 1
µB
>
eνB − 1
νB
(F36)
Therefore, we have proven that
QM2µµ
µAµB
− QM1νννAνB > 0, i.e.
∂Y a11
∂µA
6= ∂Y
b
11
∂µA
(F37)
Similarly, one can show that
∂Y b11
∂µB
6= ∂Y
a
11
∂µB
(F38)
Therefore, for any given intensities (νA, νB), the
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rate function R(µA, µB) is not smooth against the two
intensities (µA, µB).
Remark: Also, though not explicitly proven here -
since νA, νB will affect not only Y
X,L
11 , but will affect
eX,U11 too, their derivatives will be a lot more complex
than µA, µB - numerically we observed that for any given
(µA, µB), the rate function R(νA, νB) is actually not
smooth against the two intensities (νA, νB) either, and
the ridge still appears at µAµB =
νA
νB
.
Appendix G: Local Search Algorithm
In this section we describe how to perform the opti-
mization for the parameters, which is an indispensable
process in obtaining the optimal key rate. In addition,
we also discuss the effect of inaccuracies and fluctuations
of the intensities and probabilities on the key rate, and
show that our method is robust even in the presence of
inaccuracies and fluctuations of the parameters.
To provide a good key rate under finite-size effects,
optimal choice of parameters is an extremely important
factor in implementing the protocol. However, the 7-
intensity protocol has an extremely large parameter space
of 12 dimensions, for which a brute-force search is next
to impossible. To put into context, a desktop PC (quad-
core i7-4790k@4.0GHz) can evaluate the function R(~v) at
approximately 105 parameter combinations ~v per second.
But searching over a very crude 10-sample resolution for
each parameter would take over 4 months, and a 100-
sample resolution for each parameter would take 3×1011
years, a time longer than the age of the universe! There-
fore, a local search algorithm must be used to efficiently
search the parameters in reasonable time.
There have been studies to apply convex optimization
to QKD e.g. in Ref. [17] to find the optimal set of pa-
rameters and in Refs. [37–39] to bound the information
leakage and secure key rate. Here we start by adopt-
ing a local search algorithm for parameter optimization,
proposed in Ref. [17], called ”coordinate descent” (CD),
which requires drastically less time than using an exhaus-
tive search. Instead of performing an exhaustive search
over the parameter space, we can descend along each axis
at a time, and iterate over each axis in turn. For instance,
suppose we currently iterate sA:
Ri+1 = max
sA∈(sAmin,sAmax)
R(sA, µ
i
A, ν
i
A, P
i
sA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA ,
siB, µ
i
B, ν
i
B, P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
=R(si+1A , µ
i
A, ν
i
A, P
i
sA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA ,
siB, µ
i
B, ν
i
B, P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
(G1)
which freezes the other coordinates, and replaces sA with
the optimal position on the current coordinate-axis sA.
In the next iteration the algorithm will descent along axis
µA, etc., hence the name coordinate descent. The search
space satisfies that: the probabilities lie within (0, 1), and
while the intensities could be in principle larger than 1,
typically that doesn’t provide a good key rate, so here we
also define the domain for all intensities as (0, 1). The
decoy intensities also follow two additional constraints
µA > νA and µB > νB. The CD algorithm is able to
reach the same optimal position as a gradient descent
algorithm (with descends along the gradient vector), the
commonly used approach for parameter optimization.
However, a significant limitation of coordinate descent
is that it does not work correctly over functions that have
discontinuous first-order derivatives (which cause the gra-
dient to be non-defined). For instance, in the presence of
a sharp ”ridge” as in Fig.2 in the main text, any arbitrary
point P on the ridge will cause the CD algorithm to ter-
minate incorrectly and fail to find the maximum point.
Mathematically, this is caused by the gradient being not
clearly defined at a position where derivatives are dis-
continuous. Therefore, coordinate descent does not work
anymore for asymmetric MDI-QKD.
As we discussed above, such discontinuity of deriva-
tives comes from the ”ridge”, µAµB =
νA
νB
. Moreover, we
know that the optimal parameters must satisfy
µoptA
µoptB
=
νoptA
νoptB
. Therefore, here we propose to use polar coordinate
instead of Cartesian coordinate to perform coordinate
descent, and jointly search µAµB and
νA
νB
. In this way, we
can make the rate vs parameter function smooth. We
redefine ~v as:
~vpolar = [sA, sB, rµ, rν , θµν , PsA , PµA , PνA , PsB , PµB , PνB ]
(G2)
where
rµ =
√
µ2A + µ
2
B rν =
√
ν2A + ν
2
B
θµν = tan
−1(µA/µB) = tan−1(νA/νB)
(G3)
In this way, the expression of Y L11 always takes the bound-
ary value (and only has a single expression). Therefore,
when other parameters are fixed, R(θµν) is actually a
smooth function, therefore by searching over the param-
eters ~vpolar, we can successfully find the optimal param-
eters and maximum rate.
After converting to polar coordinates and jointly
searching θµν , the coordinate descent algorithms be-
comes:
Ri+1 = max
sA∈(sAmin,sAmax)
R(sA, s
i
B, r
i
µ, r
i
ν , θ
i
µν ,
P isA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA , P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
=R(si+1A , s
i
B, r
i
µ, r
i
ν , θ
i
µν ,
P isA , P
i
µA , P
i
νA , P
i
sB , P
i
µB , P
i
νB)
(G4)
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Additionally, when searching along each coordinate
(for instance, fixing other parameters and searching sA),
we employ an iterative searching technique to further ac-
celerate the algorithm, which starts out with a coarse
resolution and iteratively narrows the search region while
increasing the resolution (this is a similar technique as in-
troduced in Ref. [17], but efficiently parallelized to utilize
multi-threading on modern PCs). For instance, we can
start out with e.g. 100 samples within the (0, 1) region
and evaluate them in parallel. After the maximal point
is found, we can then choose two neighboring samples
on the left and right of the maximal point, and start a
finer search among 10 more samples between them. This
process can be iterated until maximum value no longer
changes significantly, or until maximum depth is reached.
Such technique allows a search resolution that dynami-
cally changes as needed (from 10−2 down to even 10−5,
although in practice often 10−3 is sufficient), and it ef-
ficiently uses e.g. the 8 threads on a quad-core CPU,
enabling fast and accurate optimization below 0.1s.
One more note is that, the key rate obtained by our
method is in fact robust against small inaccuracies in the
parameters. For instance, for Point A3 (10km, 60km) in
Table III, if we round all parameters to an accuracy of
0.001 (as shown in Table IV) and use it for simulation, we
can still get 99.5% of the optimal key rate 3.106× 10−5,
while rounding the parameters to 0.01 will still give us
93.0% of the optimal key rate. In fact, even if we just
keep one significant digit of each parameter, we can still
get 47.6% of the optimal key rate. This would make it
much easier for an experimental implementation of our
method, as the key rate is very forgiving of inaccuracies
in the parameters, which makes a much less stringent re-
quirement on the intensity modulators and random num-
ber generators.
Note that, the above ”accuracy” discusses how
strict the requirement is for us to generate an inten-
sity/probability with mean value close to the desired op-
timal value (e.g. limited by bits in the random number
generator or the accuracy of the intensity modulator),
but we are still assuming we have perfect knowledge of
the variables we generate. In addition, here we would like
to point out that our conclusions remain unchanged, even
in the presence of intensity fluctuations, or imprecision
in the intensity probabilities.
Firstly, the system is not very sensitive to the prob-
abilities (since the partial derivatives with respect to
them are zero at the optimal points), so even if all signal
and decoy probabilities are simultaneously set 5% away
from optimal value (and we take the global worst-case
key rate value among all possible combinations of pos-
itive/negative deviation for each variable), the key rate
will not significantly drop - for instance for the (10km,
60km) case, one can still obtain 92.3% the ideal key rate
(2.869× 10−5 versus 3.106× 10−5) even with a 5% devi-
ation for the probabilities.
Similarly, for intensity fluctuations, even if we add a
5% deviation to all intensities (again, taking the (10km,
60km) case as an example) we can still get 73.1% the ideal
key rate (2.270 × 10−5 versus 3.106 × 10−5). Moreover,
one important point to note is that, intensity fluctua-
tion is not a problem unique to asymmetric MDI-QKD
(or the new asymmetric protocol that we propose in this
work). Even if one uses prior protocols (such as the 4-
intensity protocol), one would still obtain a significantly
lower key rate if taking intensity fluctuation into consid-
eration, such as 39.9% the key rate (3.671× 10−5 versus
9.206 × 10−6 with no fluctuation) at (0km, 50km), and
zero key rate (versus 3.891×10−7 with no fluctuation) at
(10km, 60km). Therefore, the advantage of our method
remains unchanged, even if intensity fluctuations are con-
sidered.
Appendix H: Finite Size analysis
In this section we describe the finite-key analysis used
in our simulations.
The analytical proofs in Appendix F are shown for the
asymptotic case. Numerically we show that 7-intensity
protocol works effectively in the finite-key regime too, as
can be observed in main text Fig. 4.
To account for finite-size effects, we perform a standard
error analysis[17, 21], and estimate the expected value 〈n〉
of an observable n by
n = n− γ√n ≤ 〈n〉 ≤ n+ γ√n = n (H1)
where we define the upper and lower bound for an ob-
servable n as n and n. Here, γ is the number of standard
deviations the confidence interval of the observed value
is from the expected value (for instance, for a required
failure probability of no more than  = 10−7, we should
set γ = 5.3).
We can denote the observed counts as nXµi,µj , and
error counts as mXµi,µj , where µi ∈ {µA, νA, ω}, µj ∈
{µB, νB, ω}. Then, the observed gain and error can be
acquired from:
QXµi,µj =
nXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
TXµi,µj =
mXµi,µj
NPµiPµj
EXµi,µj =
TXµi,µj
QXµi,µj
(H2)
where N is the total number of signals sent, and Pµi , Pµj
are the probabilities for Alice and Bob to send the re-
spective intensities. Note that here we define the QBER
in terms of error-gains:
TXµi,µj = Q
X
µi,µjE
X
µi,µj (H3)
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As described in Appendix F, we can define the key rate
expression as [3, 21]:
R = PsPs{sAsBe−(sA+sB)Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(H4)
and the single-photon gain and error estimated by [4]:
Y X,L11 =
1
µA − νA (
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ )
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBTνν − eνATνω
−eνBTων + Tωω)
(H5)
where QM1νν , Q
M2
µµ are linear combination terms of the ob-
servables
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
(H6)
Now, with standard error analysis, we can define the
upper and lower bounds for the gain and error-gain:
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj + γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
QXµiµj = Q
X
µiµj − γ
√
QXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj + γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
TXµiµj = T
X
µiµj − γ
√
TXµiµj
NPµiPµj
(H7)
Therefore, we have
QM1νν = e
νA+νBQXνν − eνAQXνω − eνBQXων +QXωω
QM2µµ = e
µA+µBQXµµ − eµAQXµω − eµBQXωµ +QXωω
Y X,L11 =
1
µA − νA (
µA
νAνB
QM1νν −
νA
µAµB
QM2µµ )
eX,U11 =
1
νAνBY
X,L
11
(eνA+νBTνν − eνATνω
−eνBTων + Tωω)
(H8)
which we can use to substitute into Eq. (G4) to obtain
the key rate under finite-size effects. (Note that here QXωω
takes the lower bound in both QM1νν and Q
M2
µµ , because
its overall coefficient is positive in Y X,L11 ).
Note that, in Ref. [21], in addition to proposing
the 4-intensity protocol, Zhou et al. has proposed a
FIG. 11. Rate vs distance (Alice to Bob) for symmetric case,
for N = 1011 using parameters Y0 = 6.02 × 10−6, ηd =
14.5%, ed = 1.5%, a parameter set in Zhou et al.’s paper
[21]. Here we compare the traditional 3-intensity protocol
as proposed in Ref.[17] (red solid line), and the 4-intensity
protocol[21] with independent-bound (blue solid line) and
joint-bound analysis (blue dot-dash line).
”joint-bounds” finite-key analysis which jointly consid-
ers the statistical fluctuations of observable Gain and
QBER. It is a tighter bound and can provide higher rate
than considering each observable’s fluctuation indepen-
dently as we’ve discussed above in this section (i.e. using
”independent-bounds”). To illustrate this, we perform a
simple simulation of key rate versus distance plot, using
independent-bounds and joint-bounds (as well as using
traditional 3-intensity protocol [17] for comparison). As
can be seen in Fig.11, 4-intensity protocol with joint-
bounds analysis provides higher rate than independent-
bounds (and both have higher rate than the 3-intensity
protocol).
However, joint-bound analysis is based on linear op-
timization and sometimes brings multiple maxima for
R(~v), which is undesirable for local search, and will re-
sult in unpredictable behaviors (such as sudden ”jitters”
in the resulting rate versus distance plot, as can be ob-
served in the joint-bound plot in Fig.11. Similar behavior
is observed in Ref.[21] too).
Here just for comparison, we list in Table V some ex-
ample data points where we apply both independent-
bound and joint-bound analysis. As can be seen, using
joint-bounds, we can indeed gain a further improved key
rate. However, this comes at the expense of not knowing
whether we are indeed at the global maximum or not,
due to the existence of multiple maxima (and is not ideal
for comparing asymmetric/symmetric protocols, as the
key rate estimated could be just local maxima for both of
them). Therefore, as the purpose of this work is studying
asymmetric MDI-QKD, we focus on independent-bounds
throughout the main text.
Also, note that although we have used standard error-
analysis for simplicity, our method here can in princi-
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TABLE V. Simulation results of key rate estimated with independent-bounds versus joint-bounds, using parameters in Table I.
The data points for independent-bounds correspond to the solid red curve in Fig.4 (d). As can be seen, using joint-bounds for
finite-size estimation can improve the key rate significantly. However, this will result in multiple maxima and cause instabilities
in simulations. Therefore, we have used independent-bounds throughout the main text.
LA LB Rindependent Rjoint
60km 10km 3.106× 10−5 6.714× 10−5
100km 50km 4.677× 10−11 7.568× 10−8
113km 63km 0 7.311× 10−10
ple be applied to finite-key analysis with composable
security, too, such as using Chernoff bound [36]. The
key point is that (as explicitly demonstrated in Appen-
dices B and C), the scaling of asymmetric MDI-QKD key
rate versus distances depends on the signal states (which
performs a trade-off between error-correction and single
photon probability). The decoy states need to main-
tain balanced arriving intensities at Charles, but only
serve to estimate the single-photon contributions as ac-
curately as possible, whose asymptotic bounds are given
by the infinite-data, infinite-decoy case. Adopting differ-
ent finite-key analysis (or no analysis at all, as in asymp-
totic case) affects the bounds on single photon gain and
QBER Y L11 and e
U
11. The finite-size case can be seen as
the asymptotic case with correction terms (i.e. imper-
fections) added to the privacy amplification, but its key
rate will have a similar scaling property as the asymp-
totic case. This means that the advantage of our method
is independent of the finite-size analysis model used (or
lack thereof, in the asymptotic case).
Appendix I: Single-Arm MDI-QKD
FIG. 12. ”Single-arm” MDI-QKD where Bob and Charles
are both in the same lab, with Bob’s channel having as little
loss as possible. By optimizing intensities, we can achieve
maximum distance (loss) in the single channel between Alice
and Charles, while enjoying the security of MDI-QKD.
In the main text we have proposed a new type of
”single-arm” MDI-QKD setup, which is the extremely
asymmetric case where one channel has high loss while
FIG. 13. Simulations of ”single-arm” MDI-QKD. We use pa-
rameters from Table I, and set N = 1011. The three lines
are generated using 4-intensity protocol and adding fibre un-
til LA = LB (black solid line), using 4-intensity protocol but
without being able to add fibre (black dashed line), and us-
ing 7-intensity protocol directly (red dot-dash line). As can
be seen, using 7-intensity protocol tremendously increases the
key rate and maximum distance for the longer single-arm. At
R = 10−7, using 7-intensity protocol (having maximum dis-
tance at 90km) increases maximum distance by 17.5 or 33.2km
(or, 3.5 to 6.6dB of loss) compared to 4-intensity with/without
fibre, respectively.
the other channel has close to zero loss. In this section
we will describe it in more detail and outline its potential
applications.
Suppose we have one crucial channel (e.g. a free-space
channel, say in a satellite-ground connection, or a ship-
to-ship connection) through which we would like to send
quantum signals. We would like to prevent all attacks on
the detector and improve the security with MDI-QKD,
but cannot add a third party in the middle of the free-
space channel. In this case, it is possible to add an-
other source Bob in the laboratory (alongside Charles’
detectors, with as small loss as possible in Bob-Charles
channel), and use it to interfere with the signals coming
from Alice over the longer free-space channel, as shown
in Fig.12. With 7-intensity protocol, high key rate can be
generated from this extremely asymmetric case, provid-
ing the security of MDI-QKD to a single channel where
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TABLE VI. Simulation results of key rate between each pair of nodes in a MDI-QKD network, using parameters from Table
I, N = 1011, and channels in main text Fig. 1(a). As can be seen, using 7-intensity protocol always provides higher rate than
either using 4-intensity directly (which fails to establish some connections) or using 4-intensity after adding fibre to each channel
to accommodate the longest channel (which results in identical low rate for every connection - since every channel equals the
longest channel after adding fibre). 7-intensity protocol therefore enables high scalability and reconfigurability because each
link is independent of other links and no added fibre is needed.
Method A1-A3 A1-A4 A1-A5 A3-A4 A3-A5 A4-A5
4-intensity, add fibre 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10 1.28× 10−10
4-intensity, direct 0 0 0 2.41× 10−4 3.22× 10−4 5.77× 10−4
7-intensity, direct 1.97× 10−7 2.42× 10−7 2.77× 10−7 2.48× 10−4 3.53× 10−4 5.87× 10−4
relays cannot be added while still maintaining good per-
formance.
If one uses 4-intensity protocol, Bob has to add a fi-
bre similar in loss to that of the free-space channel (to
maintain the symmetry), while as we’ve shown with 7-
intensity protocol, Bob can simply choose as small a loss
as possible, and obtain maximum acceptable loss in Al-
ice’s channel. Not only does 7-intensity protocol make
such a highly asymmetric MDI-QKD possible, it actu-
ally provides a higher rate compared to the symmetric
case (if Bob adds a fibre). Moreover, since Alice’s chan-
nel loss might be constantly changing, it can be very
difficult to adjust an added fibre and maintain the sym-
metry, thus the convenience of not having to add any loss
with 7-intensity protocol is a significant factor, too.
As we can observe in main text Fig. 4(a)(b), for the
same required minimum rate, rather than performing an
experiment at (Lmax, Lmax), if we are free to adjust one
channel (and want maximum distance in the other chan-
nel), we can set the shorter channel to zero, and obtain
a longer distance in the other channel, e.g. (L′max, 0)
with L′max > Lmax. For instance, in main text Fig.
4(a)(b), choosing point B(102km, 0km) can extend the
longer arm from 85km to 102km, from the symmetric
point A(85km, 85km) for the same R = 10−10.
Here we list the simulations results for single-arm
MDI-QKD. To demonstrate the advantage, here we
study three-cases: using 4-intensity (but being able to
add fibre until channels are symmetric), using 4-intensity
(however, due to being e.g. in a free-space channel or
a dynamic network, without the luxury to add fibres
and compensate for the channels), and using 7-intensity
directly on the asymmetric channels. As can be seen in
Fig.13, 7-intensity protocol provides better performance
that both strategies using 4-intensity, and increases
maximum distance from 56.8km and 72.5km (respec-
tively for adding/not adding fibre) to 90km. Thus, our
new protocol can enable a unique new application of
providing the security of MDI-QKD to a single channel
where relays cannot be added (e.g. a free-space link),
while still maintaining high key rate.
Appendix J: MDI-QKD Network Numerical Results
In this section we consider the channels from a real
quantum network setup in Vienna, reported in Ref.[13],
and numerically show that using 7-intensity protocol can
provide high-rate communication between each pair of
users, while previous protocols either fail to establish
some connections in the network, or suffer from low key
rate for all connections.
Here, we focus here on the high-asymmetry nodes in
Ref.[13], A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, plotted in main text Fig.
1(a), and consider the case where an untrusted relay is
placed at A2. The topology here is a commonly stud-
ied model of a star-type network, which is considered
for QKD network in [40, 41], and is also the model for
the MDI-QKD network experiment in Ref.[16]. Such a
network can provide a complete graph of connections be-
tween any two users, but only requires one physical con-
nection from each user. We show the simulation results
in Table VI, where using 7-intensity protocol consistently
provides high-rate connections even for nodes with very
high asymmetry, and maintains the same (in fact moder-
ately higher) key rate for nodes that are near-symmetric,
i.e. including a long channel doesn’t affect the rate be-
tween pairs of existing shorter channels.
Being able to establish connections with arbitrarily
placed new nodes without affecting existing nodes is a
very important property for a protocol to be used in
a scalable and reconfigurable network, whose links will
obviously be, more often than not, asymmetric. For
the 4-intensity protocol, to accommodate the highest-loss
channel, all connections will suffer from non-optimal key
rate. Moreover, since new users might be added/deleted
dynamically, such adding-fibre strategy will have poor
scalability, since each new node affects the performance of
all existing nodes, and also causes interruption of service
when users update their fibres. With 7-intensity proto-
col, we are completely free of the worries of asymmetry,
and can directly use the protocol on any channel com-
bination optimally, so each node can be added/deleted
without affecting the rest. This greatly improves not
only the key rate, but also the scalability of a MDI-QKD
network.
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